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INTRODUCTION

Since the earliest days of our State, the collection of delinquent real
estate taxes has presented challenges for both the courts and the egislature. This
story began shortly after the Revolutionary War, was significantly influenced
by decisions made at the time of West Virginia's statehood, has required a
constitutional amendment, and is once again deserving of the court's attention.
Much earlier in my academic career, I wrote an article entitled Forfeited and
Delinquent Lands-The Unresolved Constitutional Issue.1 I find it somewhat
ironic that a quarter of a century later, I return to plough that field again. As
will be discussed infra, while the safeguard of "due process" to tax sales is
well-established by the courts, the application of that principle to tax sale
*
William J. Maier, Jr. Dean Emeritus and Robert M. Steptoe and James D. Steptoe
Professor of Property Law. The author acknowledges with sincere appreciation the support of the
West Virginia University College of Law and the Arthur B. Hodges Faculty Research Fund in the
preparation of this article. I also acknowledge with sincere appreciation the research assistance of
Lara K. Omps, Senior Managing Editor of the West Virginia Law Review, Volume 114, Class of
2012. Also, my thanks to Robert L. Shuman for his comments and suggestions in the preparation
of this article.
I
John W. Fisher, II, Forfeited andDelinquent Lands-The Unresolved ConstitutionalIssue,
89 W. VA. L. REv. 961 (1987).
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presents challenges. As Chief Justice Roberts said in Jones v. Flowers, "'it is
not our responsibility to prescribe the form of service that the [government]
should adopt."' 2 "In prior cases, finding notice inadequate, we have not
attempted to redraft the State's notice statute." In West Virginia, where much
of the responsibility for notifying the delinquent taxpayer of the pending loss of
his/her property is, by statute, assigned to the tax lien purchaser, the Court's
role in safeguarding due process is critical. This article will briefly note how
the early efforts to settle western Virginia created a variety of problems as to
land ownership, how the legislature attempted to use the state's taxing authority
to resolve issues of conflicting ownership, and how those efforts shape nearly a
century of real estate tax jurisprudence. This historical background will help us
to understand the 1994 legislative "reform" and the due process issue it has
created.
II. "A MOST WRETCHED AND EMBARRASSED CONDITION"

The history of forfeited and delinquent lands was traced in the earlier
article4 and will not be repeated herein. However, to put the present issue in
perspective, a brief history is helpful and excerpts from Judge Snyder's opinion
in McClure v. Maitland provide a good summary.
In the Maitland decision, Judge Snyder traced the efforts of Virginia to
settle the lands of western Virginia, starting with the establishment of the land
office for the Commonwealth of Virginia by act of the General Assembly in
May of 1779 ("May 1779 Statute") to the adoption of the West Virginia
Constitution of 1872.6 As to the initial efforts to settle the western lands of
Virginia, he noted: "any person, upon the payment into the treasury of two
cents per acre, could obtain from the register of the land office warrants for as
much land as he might desire to enter."7 A procedure was established for the
land to be surveyed within a fixed period of time. The Governor would then
issue a grant to to the owner of the survey.8
Judge Snyder noted:
The result of this loose, cheap and unguarded system of
disposing of her public lands was, that in less than twenty years
nearly all of them were granted-the greater part to mere

2
547 U.S. 220, 238 (alteration in original) (quoting Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455
n.9 (1982)).
Id.
4
See generally Fisher,supra note 1, at 961-86.
s
24 W. Va. 561 (1884).

7

See id. at 563-69.
Id at 564.

8

Id

6
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adventurers, in large tracts, containing not only thousands but
frequently hundreds of thousands of acres in one tract. The
grantees were often non-residents and few of them ever saw
their lands or expected to improve or use them for purposes
other than speculation. The entries and surveys were often
made without reference to prior grants, thus creating interlocks
and covering land previously granted, so that in many instances
the same land was granted to two or more different persons.
Sometimes upon one survey actually located others were
constructed on paper by the surveyors without even going upon
or seeing the lands, thus making blocks of surveys containing
thousands of acres none of which were ever surveyed or
identified by any marks or natural monuments. 9
This initial effort to settle and improve the lands in western Virginia
proved to be an abysmal failure. Judge Snyder summarized the state of affairs
fifty years after the adoption of the May 1779 Statute as follows:
In this utter confusion and embarrassment it was found
absolutely necessary to resort to earnest and rigid measures to
compel the owners of land to pay their taxes or in default
thereof to have their titles entirely vacated and the lands vested
in or transferred to actual settlers and those who were willing
to improve the lands and pay taxes on them.10
Starting in April of 1831, the Virginia General Assembly adopted a
series of statutes addressing its forfeited and delinquent lands." In 1837, the
General Assembly passed a statute providing for the sale of lands that were
forfeited to the Commonwealth.12 The 1837 statute provided that it was the
duty of the circuit superior court for each county west of the Blue Ridge
Mountains to appoint a commissioner or commissioners to sell the lands.' 3 The
last enactment in this series was in March 1846.14
Upon West Virginia's statehood, the then statutory scheme of Virginia
for the sale of forfeited and delinquent lands was incorporated into the laws of
West Virginia as part of both the Constitution of 1863 and the Constitution of
1872 and accompanying statutory provisions.' 5

10

Id.
Id. at 566.

12

Id. at 567.

13

14

See id.
See id. at 569.

1s

See id. at 572.

9

See id.
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As more fully discussed in the previous article,16 an important aspect of
the West Virginia constitutional provision was that before the forfeited and
delinquent land could be sold by the state through the deputy commissioners of
forfeited and delinquent lands ("deputy commissioner"), ' the state had to have
"absolute title." The right to redeem granted in the statute after the forfeited and
delinquent land was certified by the State Auditor to the deputy commissioner
for sale, and the right of the prior owner to any "excess" sum above the taxes,
interest, and expenses of the sale were considered as acts of grace on behalf of
the State.18
In McClure v. Maitland, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia determined that these sales were merely the acts of an agent for the
State and, as such, did not constitute a judicial proceeding.19 While Maitland
See generally Fisher,supra note 1.
State auditors served as commissioners by appointment and each commissioner had deputy
commissioners serving under him.
16
17

18

Judge Snyder explained this act of grace as follows:
The preceding, or fourth section of the Constitution, shows that the former
owner, by reason of the forfeiture, was divested of every particle of interest
in the land and its proceeds, and that he had no more title or right to either
than if he had never had any interest in the land. It necessarily follows then
that the grant or claim thus conferred upon him, is a simple matter of grace, a
gift without any consideration therefore, owing its whole existence to the
volition of the grantor, and it is in no sense the recognition of a pre-existing
right to, or claim upon the land or its proceeds. It is a mere bounty
gratuitously bestowed by the State, which she had the undoubted right to give
or withhold. And having this perfect right to give or not to give, the State
unquestionably had the right, if she chose to make the gift, to fix not only its
quantum, but also the form in which it should be received and the manner of
its payment. This she has done in explicit terms by fixing the surplus as the
quantum, the proceeds as the form and the filing of his claim therefore within
two years after the sale of the land as the manner. It is apparent that the
terms, "excess of the sum for which the land may be sold over the taxes,"
&c., are employed not to give the former owner an interest in the surplus
proceeds as such, but merely as a measure of the quantum to which he shall
be entitled upon filing his claim within the time prescribed. The whole
history as well as the express language of this constitutional provision proves
that it was the intention to bestow upon the former owner whatever part of
the proceeds of sale might be actually paid or liable to be paid into the State
treasury, after the State had sold the land and paid all the taxes, costs, &c.,
out of the proceeds of the sale; and that it was clearly not intended to give
him any interest in the land or its proceeds until a surplus should be
ascertained by the proceedings conducted alone by the State through her
officers. "Beggars must not be choosers" is a just maxim, and, therefore, it is
the duty of the courts to see that the bounty of the State is not used to her
detriment by giving to this provision of her Constitution a forced
construction and one that could never had been intended. I am, therefore, of
opinion that said fifth section of the Constitution did not confer upon the
appellant, Maitland, any claim or interest in the land, or any interest or right
to participate in the proceedings for its sale, his right to the surplus proceeds
not arising until after the sale.
Maitland,24 W.Va. at 580-81.
19
Additionally, Judge Snyder discussed the following:
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had asserted a constitutional right to notice of the proceeding in the circuit
court, the court rejected the claim stating, "I do not think this position can be
maintained upon any legal ground, because it erroneously assumes that the
proceeding is a judicial one and that Maitland, as the former owner, has an
interest in or lien on the land or some interest in these proceedings."20
It is fair to assume that the "wretched and embarrassed"2 1 state of
affairs regarding land titles which led to the statutory provision in Virginia and
which became the basis of West Virginia law both dominated and influenced
Judge Snyder's view on this issue. As Judge Snyder explained in his opinion:
In the year 1831, as we have endeavored to show in a former
part of this opinion, the land titles in that portion of the
These authorities indicate that the acts of the court in ordering and
confirming sales are merely ex parte and not judicial proceedings in the sense
that they involve litigation or the determination of a controversy between
adverse parties. They are in my opinion more in the nature of administrative
and ex parte proceedings-such as orders and entries made by courts in
transacting the police and fiscal matters of a county-than they are in the
nature of judicial controversies. They are merely a mode provided by the
State for affecting the sale of lands which are her absolute property. She
being a corporate body can act only by agents duly appointed by her. The
commissioner and the court are her agents appointed for that purpose. The
constitutional and statutory provisions, authorizing and declaring the manner
of making these sales, are in effect a power of attorney or commission
appointing and conferring upon the court and commissioner the authority to
sell them, and the reports of the commissioner and the orders of the court,
with the deed of the commissioner to the purchaser, are merely the evidence
of the sale and transfer of the title from the State to the purchaser. The State
could have established any other agency for the disposal of her lands having
no connection with her courts, and sales thus made would be just as effectual
to pass her title as those made under this form of proceeding. The Federal
government and the commonwealth of Virginia sell their lands through the
agency of their respective land offices without any pretense of a judicial
proceeding, and no one questions their power to do so.
Id. at 579.
20
Id at 575. Later in the opinion, ii distinguishing the sheriffs sale from the deputy
commissioner sale, the court explained:
In the argument for the appellant it was assumed that sales made by
commissioners of school lands were in some respects similar to sales of lands
by sheriffs for delinquent taxes, and that, therefore, the proceedings must be
construed with the same strictness and scrutiny. This is clearly a mistaken
view. In the case of such sales by the sheriffs, the lands sold are the property
of the owner, the State having no claim thereto beyond her taxes. The sale is
the enforcement of the State's lien for her taxes and nothing more. But in the
case of sales by the commissioner of school lands, the lands sold are the
absolute property of the State, the former owner having no interest therein
whatever. If the sale is irregular or improper in the former case the owner is
prejudiced and he has the undoubted right to test the legality of the sale; but
in the latter case the former has no interest and cannot, therefore, be
prejudiced by the sale, however irregular or improper the proceedings under
which it was made.

Id. at 581.
21

Id. at 575.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 115, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 10

48

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115

commonwealth of Virginia now embraced within this State
were in a most wretched and embarrassed condition. Many
owners of large tracts, covering in some cases almost entire
counties, would neither pay their taxes nor settle and improve
their lands, thus paralyzing the energy and contravening the
prosperity of the people and the advancement and population
of the State to an almost inconceivable extent. In this
emergency and to remedy this calamitous evil the General
Assembly of Virginia inaugurated the system of delinquent and
forfeiture laws that form the basis of the provisions of our
present Constitution on that subject. The whole history of that
system shows a most earnest and determined effort on the part
of the Legislature, the Judiciary and the people, speaking
through our present Constitution, to destroy and annihilate the
titles of such delinquent owners, who should, after every
reasonable opportunity had been given them to comply with
the laws, continue in default, and to protect actual settlers and
those not in default. The purpose of the statute passed to
enforce this system was not merely to create a lien for the taxes
on these delinquent and unoccupied lands, but to effect by their
own force and vigor an absolute forfeiture of them and
effectually vest the title thereto in the State without the
machinery of any proceeding of record or anything in the
nature of an inquest of office. Such was intended to be and
such was in fact the effect of these statues.2 2
For the next one hundred years, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia and the legislature both struggled with various aspects of Judge
Snyder's analysis/explanation of our State's procedure to return forfeited and
delinquent lands into the hands of a responsible taxpayer.23
III. DUE PROCESS - ROUND 1
While an extended discussion of the forfeited and delinquent lands
procedure in effect in West Virginia from statehood until 1993 is not necessary
for present purposes, a brief explanation would be useful.2 4 In West Virginia,
the law imposes a duty on each real property owner to have their land entered

Id at 575-76.
My earlier article traces those court decisions and legislative actions during that period. See
generallyFisher,supra note 1.
24
A succinct overview is provided in a student note, see Carla Williams, Note, Forfeitedand
Delinquent Lands: Resolving the Due Process Deficiencies, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 251, 253-55
(1993).
22
23
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on the land books for taxation purposeS25 and to pay the taxes thereon. 26 Failure
to have it entered on the land books resulted in a forfeiture for non-entry, 27 and
the failure to pay the taxes resulted in the sale of the real estate for
delinquency.2 8 The initial sale was by the county sheriff at the "steps" of the
courthouse.29 If a purchaser bid an amount equal to or greater than the total of
the taxes, interest, and costs of the sale, and if certain statutorily required
procedures were followed 30 in approximately eighteen months, the purchaser
was entitled to a deed for the property executed by the clerk of the county
commission.3 '
If there was no bid that was equal to or greater than the total of the
taxes, interest, and costs, the property was "sold" to the State and certified to
the Auditor as the commissioner of forfeited and delinquent lands.32 After the
passage of a proscribed period of time, the property became irredeemable by
the former owner, i.e. absolute title vested in the state.33 After the title became
irredeemable in the State, the land was "certified" to a deputy commissioner for
forfeited and delinquent lands for the county in which the land was located.34
While the former owner had the right to redeem after the land was certified to
the deputy commission, this was "an act of grace" on behalf of the State.35 The
deputy commissioner filed an in rem suit and then offered the land for sale at
public auction. If there were no bids, the deputy commissioner could sell the
land via a private sale. Upon confirmation of the "purchase price" by the court,
the deputy commissioner issued a deed for the property.
The tension that exists between two legitimate concerns that has
challenged our courts and the legislation since statehood continues to this day.
W. VA. CONST. art. 13, § 6; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 1 IA-4-2 (LexisNexis 1991); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 11A-3-37 (LexisNexis 1991).
26
W. VA. CONST. art. 13, § 6; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 1A-2-2(a) (LexisNexis 1991).
27
W. VA. CONST. art.13, § 6; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11A-3-37 (LexisNexis 1994).
28
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 1 lA-2-10 (LexisNexis 1994).
29
Id. §§ 1 1A-3-4 to -5.
25

Id. §§ 11A-3-19 to -21.
31
Id. § 11A-3-27 (changed to the State Auditor by an amendment in 2010).
32
Id. § 11A-3-6 (until changed by the Constitutional Amendment and statutory rewrite in
1993 and 1994 in W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11A-3-8 (LexisNexis 2010)).
3
Id. § 11A-4-3 (LexisNexis 1991).
34
Id. § 11A-4-5, -9.
3
Id. § 11A-4-19; Pearson v. Dodd, 221 S.E.2d 171, 267 (W. Va. 1975), overruled in part by
Syl. pt. 3, Lilly v. Duke, 376 S.E.2d 122 (W. Va. 1988) (overruling "Syllabus Point 9 . .. insofar
as it precludes a landowner or other party having an interest in real property from bringing suit to
set aside the property based on a constitutionally defective notice at the sheriffs sale for
delinquent taxes."). Lilly v. Duke is discussed infra.
36
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11A-4-10 (LexisNexis 1974).
30

3

See Pearson,221 S.E.2d 171.
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On the one hand, the State wants to collect "its" taxes from the owner of the
property, and if the owner does not pay the taxes, to transfer the property into
the hands of a taxpayer who will. On the other hand, an owner should not lose
title to his/her property without due process of the law. Thus, the courts began
to struggle with what constitutes due process of the law.
IV. THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF JUDGE SNYDER'S ANALYSIS
Historically, the notice to the "owner" of the delinquent or non-entered
property was by a legal notice published38 in the local paper. 39 The adequacy of
notice by publication in the context of the settlement of trusts was before the
United States Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust.40
Mullane involved a New York statute which permitted banks to "pool" smaller
trust funds for management and investment to gain efficiencies. 41 The statute
also provided that notice to the beneficiaries of accountings could be given
42
solely by publication in a local newspaper. Upon the filing of the petition for
the settlement of accounts in the Surrogate's Court, a special guardian and
attorney was appointed to represent "all persons known or unknown not
otherwise appearing who had, or might thereafter, have any interest in the
income of the common trust fund.""3
The special guardian of the income interest, the "appellant, appeared
specially, objecting that notice and the statutory provisions for notice to
beneficiaries were inadequate to afford due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment." 44 The United States Supreme Court agreed with the appellant
that notice solely by publication did not satisfy due process. In so holding, the
Court said:
Against this interest of the State, we must balance the
individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. This is defined by our holding that ["][t]he
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity
to be heard.["] This right to be heard has little reality or worth
unless one is informed that the matter is pending and choose
for himself whether to appear on default, acquiesce, or
contest....

38

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11A-4-12 (LexisNexis 1974).

39

42

See generally Pearson,221 S.E.2d 171; Fisher, supra note 1.
339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Id. at 307.
Id at 309-10.

43

Id. at 310.

4

Id. at 311.

40
41
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An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in
any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections.

...

But when notice is a person's due, process which is a mere
gesture is not due process. The means employed must be such
as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might
45
reasonably adopt to accomplish it.
Due process, in the context of tax sales, was first addressed by the
46
United States Supreme Court in Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams. In

Mennonite, the United States Supreme Court held that since "a mortgagee
possesses a substantial property interest that is significantly affected by a tax
sale-a mortgagee clearly has a legally protected property interest, he is
entitled to notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of a pending tax sale." 47
Even though the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had rejected
the "due process" argument in a delinquent tax case, Pearson v. Dodd,48 in
1975, our Court, on occasion, did demonstrate a concern for delinquent
taxpayers with "sympathetic" facts. Two cases from the early 1980's illustrate
this concern. The cases are Don S. Co. v. Roach49 and Cook v. Duncan.50 In
reading these cases, it is important to keep in mind that in 1975 the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had decided Pearson v. Dodd,51 rejecting a
due process challenge to West Virginia's tax sale procedure, and both of these
cases were decided before the United States Supreme Court's decision in
52

Mennonite.

It is also fair to assume that our Court may have misinterpreted the
United States Supreme Court's per curiam53 decision dismissing the grant of

Id. at 314-15 (citations omitted).
46
462 U.S. 791 (1983). The possibility that the West Virginia case of Pearsonv. Dodd, may
have been the case in which the Supreme Court applied due process to "tax sales" is discussed in
Fisher, supra note 1, at 989-94.
47
462 U.S. at 798. The Mennonite Court further held that since the mortgagee was
reasonably identifiable, notice by newspaper publication and posting in the county courthouse
does not satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 799-800.
48
221 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1975); see generally Fisher,supra note 1.
49
285 S.E.2d 491 (W. Va. 1981).
5o
301 S.E.2d 837 (W. Va. 1983).
51
221 S.E.2d 171.
52
The "due process" portion of Pearson v. Dodd was overruled by the Court in Lilly v. Duke,
376 S.E.2d 122 (W. Va. 1988).
5
The court explained:
45
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certiorari in the appeal of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia's
decision in Pearson v. Dodd.
In Don S. Co. v. Roach,54 Donald and Shirley Roach failed to pay the
taxes on land and a house which they had purchased in 1973 for $8,500.00. 5
The land and house were sold by the sheriff for non-payment of taxes.s6 Since
no bid to purchase was received at the sheriffs tax sale, the property was
purchased by the sheriff on behalf of the State. After the statutory period of
eighteen months had passed without the property being redeemed, the property
was offered for sale by the Deputy Commissioner of Forfeited and Delinquent
Lands for Harrison County.58 Don S. Company, Inc. purchased the property for
$325, and following the confirmation of the sale by the circuit court, a deed
dated June 19, 1979 was executed and delivered to the purchaser.59 On October
20, 1979, the purchaser notified the Roachs of its intent to take possession of
the property and demanded that they vacate. When they refused to vacate,
litigation ensued.60 The Roachs argued that notice solely by means of
publication did not satisfy due process requirements.6 1 The evidence in the case
established Mr. Roach's illiteracy and that Mrs. Roach neither regularly
received nor read the local newspaper in which the notice required by the

The Jurisdictional Statement phrased the due process question presented by
the appeal as whether notice by publication of the tax sale was
constitutionally deficient, but was unclear whether the challenge was directed
to the 1962 sale to the State [the Sheriff's tax sale] or to the 1966 sale
[Deputy Commission's sale] to appellee Dodd. At oral argument counsel for
appellant made clear, however, that her challenge was not addressed to the
procedures for notice attending the 1962 transfer of the interest to the State,
Tr. Of Oral Arg. 21-23, but solely to the procedures for notice attending the
1966 sale of the interest by the State to appellee Dodd. Indeed, we were
repeatedly informed that the 1962 sale to the State was not even "an issue in
this case." But under state law absolute title had vested in the State at the
expiration of the 18-month period after the 1962 sale during which appellant
might have exercised but did not exercise her right to redeem: § 11 A-4-12
expressly provides that in such land sold to the State for nonpayment of
taxes. . . (which has) become irredeemable. . . ." Appellant thus has no
constitutionally protected property or entitlement interest upon which she
may base a challenge of constitutional deficiency in the notice provisions
attending the 1966 sale to appellee Dodd. The appeal is therefore dismissed
for want of a properly presented federal question.
Pearson v. Dodd, 429 U.S. 396, 397-98 (1977) (citations omitted); see also Fisher,supra note 1,
at 986-89.
54
285 S.E.2d 491 (W. Va. 1981).

Id. at 493.
56

57
58
5

60
61

Id. at 492.
Id
Id
Id. at 493.
Id. at 494.
See generally id at 493-94.
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statute should have been published.62 In holding the tax deed void, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia stated:
The uncontroverted evidence on the record before us reveals
that in the instant case the appellants received no tax ticket or
other notice informing them that taxes on their real property
were due, or advising them of their duty to pay taxes. We
cannot allow the exploitation through law of the weak and
ignorant by the rich and powerful, particularly where the price
paid by the appellee for the appellant's property is so
disproportionately less than the actual value of the real estate.
We therefore hold that where a landowner has no notice that
real estate taxes are due, and of his duty to pay such taxes, and
where there is not evidence of record indicating that notice was
published in compliance with statute, a jurisdictional defect
arises which renders void the tax deed to the property. We wish
to emphasize that we do not here reach the question of the
constitutionality of the notice by publication provisions of
Chapter IlA, article 3; rather we find that under the particular
set of facts revealed by the record in this case, the appellants
were deprived of their property without sufficient notice. We
do not believe the holding of this case will extend to literate
people with knowledge of their duty to pay taxes.63
Two years later, and on the same day the United States Supreme Court
heard arguments in Mennonite, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
handed down its decision in Cook v. Duncan.f4 In Cook, Barbara Cook had
purchased three lots in Harpers Ferry in 1974 for $17,200.65 The mailing
address for the lots was Route 3, Harpers Ferry, and that was the address to
which tax notices were sent.66 The three lots were assessed and taxed as a
single entity.6 7 At all times relevant, Barbara Cook lived in Frederick,
Maryland.
Barbara Cook paid the 1974 taxes, and she paid the first half of the
taxes for 1975 in person with a check listing her Frederick, Maryland address.69
The taxes for the second half of 1975 became delinquent, and the tax lien
encumbering the lots was sold at the sheriffs sale on November 8, 1976, to
62

Id at 496.

63

Id. (citations omitted).

6

301 S.E.2d 837 (W. Va. 1983).
Id at 838.

65
66

Id.

67

Id

68

Id.

69

Id
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Dale Duncan for $450.00.70 The tax related notices were sent to the Route 3,
Harpers Ferry address and returned marked "moved, left no address."7 ' The tax
deed was issued on May 26, 1978, and the suit to set aside the tax deed was
filed on November 22, 1978.72 Ms. Cook argued that "the county clerk's
attempt to provide her with notice of her right to redeem the property was
insufficient." 73 On the facts of the case, the Court held that the county clerk
failed to exercise the "due diligence" required by the West Virginia Code,74 and
therefore, the tax deed should be set aside. As to the facts in the case, the Court
stated:
Once the county clerk was confronted with conflicting
evidence regarding Cook's residency, he should have diligently
sought to determine her actual residence. This may have
revealed Cook's Frederick, Md., address. In such an event,
publication by notice would have occurred just as it did in the
actual case. The crucial difference is that the letter informing
the appellant of her right to redeem would have been sent to
Frederick, Md., rather than to an address which everyone knew
was where Cook did not live. Sending the notice to the
Maryland address would have been most likely to apprise the
appellant of her right to redeem.
Our interpretation of the county clerk's duty in this regard
necessarily defeats the appellees' argument that "due
diligence" is required only when a person's residence is
unknown. As a threshold matter, the county clerk must use
"due diligence" to determine whether the delinquent property
owner is a resident or non-resident of West Virginia. If the
owner is a resident, then notice of the right to redeem must be
provided by personal service. If the county clerk determines
the property owner's residence to be out of state, then service
must be by publication and by letter sent to the owner's
specific address discovered during the clerk's investigation. If
after use of "due diligence" the county clerk is unable to
determine the owner's residence, service by publication and a
letter sent to the owner's last known address is permissible.
The county clerk's efforts should be guided by the idea that
proper notice of the right to redeem to the property owner is a
necessary prerequisite to transfer of title to real property.

70

Id.

n1

Id. at 838.
id

72

74
74

Id.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11 -3-24 (LexisNexis 1967).
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Our ruling in no way is a defense to the appellant's admitted
failure to pay property taxes. We do not condone such action.
The appellant knew she owed taxes and had paid them in the
past. Her actions, however, do not reduce the necessity of
providing adequate notice of her right to redeem. Without the
notice required by law, sale of property for taxes is fatally
flawed; therefore, all efforts must be directed toward locating
the specific residence of delinquent property owners so that
they may be notified of pending property transfers.
While it was less than three months after the decision in Cook v.
Duncan7 6 that the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Mennonite,n it took five years before the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia reconsidered its holding in Pearsonv. Dodd.
In Lilly v. Duke, 9 the Court recognized the inherent "due process"
problem in the West Virginia constitutional and statutory procedure which
ultimately necessitated the repeal of certain sections of Article XIII of the West
Virginia Constitution and the rewriting of Articles 3 and 4 of Chapter 11 A of
the Code.so In so holding, it overruled its decision in Pearsonv. Dodd."
In Lilly v. Duke, to pay for the 1980 taxes, the tax lien upon the land in
question was sold by the Sheriff of Jackson County.82 There were no bids for
the tax lien at the sheriffs sale on October 19, 1981, so the sheriff "purchased"
the lien on behalf of the State.83 After it was certified to the Auditor as the
Commissioner of Forfeited and Delinquent Lands, it was not redeemed, and
pursuant to the statute it was certified to the Deputy Commissioner for
Forfeited and Delinquent Lands of Jackson County who filed suit on September
12, 1983.84 At the deputy commissioner auction held on December 9, 1983,
Gary H. Duke purchased the tax lien upon the subject tract for fifty dollars.85
The tax deed was executed by the deputy commissioner and delivered to him
on December 28, 1983.86 The plaintiff, who was a previous owner of and the

7
76

n
78

7
80
81
82

Cook, 301 S.E.2d at 842-43.
Cook v. Duncan was decided on March 30, 1983.
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams was decided on June 22, 1983.
221 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1975).
376 S.E.2d 122 (W. Va. 1988).
See infra Part V.
Syl. pt. 3, Lilly, 376 S.E.2d at 123.
Id. at 123.

83

Id

84

Id

85

Id. at 124.

86

Id.
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beneficiary under a deed of trust encumbering the property given by the
Taylors, the purchasers of the property in whose names the taxes became
delinquent, filed suit on August 2, 1984, to set aside the tax deed. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia set aside the tax deed holding
in Syllabus Point 1:
There are certain constitutional due process requirements for
notice of a tax sale of real property. Where a party having an
interest in the property can reasonably be identified from
public records or otherwise, due process requires that such
party be provided notice by mail or other means as certain to
ensure actual notice. 88
A month later in Anderson v. Jackson,89 the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia again considered the issue of due process in the context of a
tax sale. In Anderson, the plaintiff was the owner of property as to which the
1975 taxes had gone delinquent for nonpayment. 90 At the sheriffs sale, there
were no bids for the tax lien on the property and, therefore, it was "sold" to the
State.91 On October 22, 1979, the tax lien on the property was sold by the
deputy commissioner, and the deed was delivered to the purchaser on
December 3, 1979.92 On July 2, 1980, the "previous owner" filed suit to set
aside the tax deed. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed
the circuit court's order setting aside the tax deed stating:
We find, on our review of the record, that no steps were taken
to provide notice to the plaintiff other than by publication. As
we state in Lilly, such notice falls short of due process
minimums and, therefore, renders the sheriffs sale a nullity.
Since the State did not acquire valid title to the tracts in
question, the deed by the deputy commissioner was properly
set aside.93
Two and one half years after the decision in Anderson v. Jackson, the
Court considered whether the decision in Lilly v. Duke applied retroactively. In
Geibel v. Clark,94 the Court held that Lilly v. Duke did not apply retroactively

87

91

Id
Id at 122.
375 S.E.2d. 827 (W. Va. 1988).
Id. at 828.
Id.

92

Id

94

Id.

94

408

9
89
90

S.E.2d

84

(W. Va. 1991).
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before June 22, 1983, the date of the Supreme Court's decision in Mennonite.
The Court's holding is summarized in Syllabus Point 1 as follows:
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, the constitutional due

process teachings of which this Court followed in Lilly v.
Duke, is not to be applied with general retroactive effect to
invalidate virtually all sheriffs' tax sales of real property, with
mere constructive notice, which were conducted before
Mennonite Board of Missions was decided on June 22, 1983.

General retroactive application of Mennonite Board of
Missions would have severely disruptive effects on land titles
in this state.
The first "notice" case to reach the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia after the Lilly and Anderson decisions was Citizens National Bank of

St. Albans v. Dunnaway.9 6 In Dunnaway, Constance L. Persinger had purchased
land in Putnam County in 1975, and it was entered in her name on the land
books for tax purposes. She then married Troy E. Dunnaway, and following
their marriage, they borrowed money and executed a deed of trust as "Troy E.
Dunnaway and Constance L. Dunnaway (formerly Constance L. Persinger)" to
secure a note for $86,644.80 payable to Citizens National Bank.98 The deed of
trust was recorded, but was only indexed under the name of Dunnaway. 99 The
Dunnaways failed to pay the 1982 taxes, and the "property" was sold by the
sheriff on November 14, 1983.100 Because there were no bidders, the sheriff
"purchased" the "property" on behalf of the State.' 0 ' Subsequently, the
"property" was certified to the Deputy Commissioner of Forfeited and
Delinquent Lands of Putnam County and sold by the deputy commissioner
pursuant to the then existing statutory procedures.1 02 Notice by publication as
required by statute was followed, and in addition, the deputy commissioner
mailed notice to "Constance Persinger" by registered mail to the property.0 3
Mrs. Dunnaway was living on the property but did not accept the registered
letter. There was no attempt to notify the bank, and the bank was not included
in the notice of publication.104

9
96

9
98

9

o

Id. at 85-86 (citations omitted).
400 S.E.2d 888 (W. Va. 1990).

Id. at 889.
Id.
Id.
Id at 890.

10 Id
102

id

103

Id at 891.
See id. at 890-91.

4
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After the circuit court authorized the sale of the "property," Mr.
Hughes purchased the property at the auction held on February 28, 1986, for
$2,000.00.'0 The deed from the deputy commissioner was delivered on March
4, 1986.106 The instant litigation began when the bank brought suit to set aside
the tax deed. 0 7 The circuit court granted summary judgment for the tax sale
purchaser. 108
In upholding the summary judgment granted for the tax sale purchaser,
our Court said:
A thread running through all the United States Supreme Court
notice cases, beginning with Mullane is the mandate that under
the due process clause a reasonable effort must be made to
provide actual notice of an event that may significantly affect a
legally protected property interest. In Mullane, the United
States Supreme Court stated that, at a minimum, due process
requires "that deprivation of life, liberty or property by
adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case." The United States
Supreme Court further observed:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due
process in any proceeding which is to be accorded
finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity
to present their objections.109
As to the facts in the instant case, the Court said:
In both Mennonite Bd. Of Missions and Lilly the mortgage and
deed of trust, respectively, were publicly recorded and no
question was raised concerning the reasonableness of the
efforts needed to identify their interest. In the present case, on
the other hand, it is undisputed that the Bank's deed of trust
was publicly recorded but improperly indexed so that the
existence of the deed of trust could not be ascertained by
reasonably diligent efforts. Although extraordinary efforts

105

Id

106

id.

107

Id.

Id.
109 Id. at 892 (citations omitted).
1os
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might have discovered the deed of trust, extraordinary efforts
are not constitutionally required."o
The Court concluded its decision stating:
In the present case, we hold that the lack of personal notice to
the Bank was caused by an improperly indexed deed of trust
that could not be located by reasonably diligent efforts, and,
therefore, no due process violation exists to vitiate the sale."
V. REWRITING THE STATUTES

Following the Lilly v. Dukell 2 decision, the legislature faced a major
problem. The Court had correctly held that "due process" required notice
before a person's substantial property interest could be taken by the State.1 3
However, Section 4, Article XIII of the West Virginia Constitution required
absolute title to be vested in the State before a deputy commissioner could file
suit to dispose of forfeited and delinquent lands.1 14
To help find a solution to the problem, the legislature sought the
assistance of the West Virginia Law Institute. The magnitude of the problem
was demonstrated by the fact that as of October 17, 1990, the Auditor had
certified 94,804 "parcels" to deputy commissioners for action."' 5 The dilemma
was this: the then existing procedure had relied upon notice by newspaper
publication as to those 94,804 "parcels," and the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia had held that such notice did not satisfy "due process." To
identify those who were entitled to notice would require title examinations and
then notice to those with a substantial property interest that satisfied "due
process." The "solution" contained in the final report of the West Virginia Law
Institute was to recommend the repeal of Sections three, four, and six of Article

"o
"
1

Id. at 892-93 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 893 (citations omitted).
376 S.E.2d 122.

113

Id
114
The "Waste and Unappropriated Lands" provision is as follows:
§4. All lands in this State, waste and unappropriated, or heretofore or
hereafter for any cause forfeited, or treated as forfeited, or escheated to the
state of Virginia, or this State, or purchased by either and become
irredeemable, not redeemed, released, transferred or otherwise disposed of,
the title whereto shall remain in this State till such sale as is hereinafter
mentioned be made, shall be proceedings in the circuit court of the county in
which the lands, or a part thereof, are situated, be sold to the highest bidder.
W. VA. CONST. art. 13, § 4; see also generally State v. Farmer Coal Co., 43 S.E.2d 625 (W. Va.
1947).
115
On file with Law Institute.
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XIII of the West Virginia Constitution,' 16 and the repeal and re-enactment of
Articles three and four of Chapter 11A of the Code. The proposed legislation
would "shift" the burden of notifying those with a substantial property interest
to the purchaser of the tax lien.' 7
A proposal to amend Article XIII of the West Virginia Constitution by
repealing Sections three, four, five, and six was adopted during the 1992
legislative session and placed on the ballot for the election held on Tuesday,
November 3, 1992.'" Following the approval of the constitutional amendment
by the voters in that election, the egislature adopted statutes patterned after the
West Virginia Law Institute's proposal. The new statutes were codified as West
Virginia Code Chapter 11A, Article 3, Sections 1 through 74, and Article 4,
Sections1 through 7, effective July 1, 1994."9
As noted above, the "new" statutes shifted the burden of satisfying
"due process" by appropriate notice to the former owner and others with a
substantial property interest to the purchaser of the tax lien. 20 Since these
statutory provisions made the cost of notice an expense of the purchaser of the
tax lien, those costs would only be incurred when there was to be a "transfer"
of ownership rights from the "former" owner or the cutting off of a substantial
property interest.
While the "new" statutory procedure provided a practical solution,
from the State's vantage point, to the cost of identifying those who should be
given notice of the right to redeem and the payment for providing such notice,
it did create a serious conflict of interest issue. As Judge Joseph R. Goodwin
said in Plemons v. Gale:121
Under West Virginia law, the tax lien purchaser has the duty to
give notice and a countervailing interest in profiting from a
property owner's failure to redeem. That is, a tax lien
purchaser is unlikely to want a property owner to receive actual
notice of her right to redeem as he hopes to make money on his
purchase. This circumstance makes it imperative that courts
strictly scrutinize efforts of a tax lien purchaser to ensure that

116 Although repeal of Section Five of Article XIII of the West Virginia Constitution was not
recommended by the West Virginia Law Institute, this section was included in the later
legislative resolution.
117 The portion of the West Virginia Law Institute's report explaining the goal of the proposed
legislation is attached as Appendix 1.
"' H.J.R. 113, 1992 Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 1992).
For a comparison of the proposed legislation with then-existing statutory procedure, see
ts
Williams, supra note 24.
120
See W. VA. CODEANN. § 11A-3-19, 21-22 (LexisNexis 1994).
121
382 F. Supp. 2d 826, 830 (S.D. W. Va. 2005).
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they are "such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee" might reasonably adopt. 12 2
The task of balancing the competing policies posed by unpaid taxes is
not easy. As noted above, on the one hand, if taxes are not being paid as to an
owner's real estate, the State has an interest in "taking" the land from the
delinquent owner and "transferring" it to an owner who will pay the taxes. On
the other hand, many of those whose taxes become delinquent are basically
conscientious, normally taxpaying individuals who, but for unintended
circumstances, would have paid the taxes. Due process requires that only when
the tax sale purchaser has "satisfied" the due process requirement should such
taxpayers lose their property through a tax sale. In such cases, "due process of
law" provides the safeguard to prevent someone from "gaming" the system.
VI. WHAT CONSTITUTES DUE PROCESS UNDER THE REVISED STATUTES?

As noted above, the Court in Lilly v. Duke had recognized that the due
process provisions of the United States Constitution and the West Virginia
Constitution must be satisfied before a significant property interest can be taken
via a tax sale. It also held that notice by publication does not normally satisfy
due process. The repeal of Sections three, four, five, and six of Article XIII by
the electorate in 1992 made it possible to rewrite Chapter 11 A, Articles three
and four of the West Virginia Code. The new tax sale procedure, in effect, said
there was no taking of a property interest at the time of the tax sale. The taking
would only occur after there was a purchaser of the State's tax lien, with the
purchaser both doing the "leg work" and paying the cost of satisfying the due
123
process requirements.
While the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has not always
approached notice issues from a due process analysis, the several notice cases
decided since the adoption of the revised statutory procedure have been
basically consistent with the result which would have been reached under such
an analysis.

122

id

For an excellent discussion of the "new" procedure and the cases thereunder see Robert L.
Shuman, The Amended and Reenacted Delinquent and Nonentered Land Statutes-The Title
Examination Ramifications, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 537 (1996) [hereinafter Shuman, Ramifications];
Robert L. Shuman, Update: The Amended and Reenacted Delinquent and Nonentered Land
Statutes-The Title Examination Ramifications, 111 W. VA. L. REv. 707 (2009) [hereinafter
Shuman, Update]; Williams, supra note 24. Shuman's Update discussed the cases decided by the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia from the passage of the "new" statutes to the
publication of the article and provides an excellent discussion of the jurisprudence evolving
under the "new" statutes. Therefore, this Article will only be concerned with those cases that
provide guidance regarding how the concept of Due Process has evolved since the passage of the
"new" statutes.
123
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The first post-statutory rewrite case involving notice was Rollyson v.
Jordan.'2 4 In Rollyson, the tax lien encumbering the property was sold to
Rollyson for unpaid taxes at a sheriffs sale on November 16, 1995.125 The
taxes had become delinquent in the name of the Nix Mining Company.12 6
Notice of the right to redeem was mailed to Nix Mining Company and returned
as not forwardable.12 7 Notice by publication of the right to redeem was made as
required by statute. On the last day of the redemption period, March 31, 1997,
an unreleased deed of trust dated September 26, 1985, given by an earlier
owner in the chain of title, was discovered.12 8 For present purposes, the issue
was whether the beneficiaries of the 1985 deed of trust and payees of the note
were entitled to notice of the right of redemption.12 9 Litigation began when
some of the payees of the note sought to set aside the tax deed to Rollyson.130
As Shuman noted,' 3' the Court held that the secured parties were entitled to
notice by construing Section 11A-3-19(a)(1) of the West Virginia Code 3 2 and
Section 11A-3-23(a) of the West Virginia Code 33 in pari materia, holding that

124
125
126
127
128
129

518 S.E.2d 372 (W. Va. 1999).
Id. at 375.
Id
Id
id.
id. at 376.

130

Id
See Shuman, Update, supra note 123.
132
W. VA. CODE. ANN. § I1A-3-19 (LexisNexis 1994). What purchaser must do before the
deed can be secured.
(a)At any time after October 31 of the year following the sheriff's sale, and
on or before December 31 of the same year, the purchaser, his or her heirs or
assigns, in order to secure a deed for the real estate subject to the tax lien or
liens purchased, shall:
(1)Prepare a list of those to be served with notice to redeem and request the
State Auditor to prepare and serve the notice as provided in sections twentyone [§ 11A-3-21] and twenty-two [§ 11A-3-22] of this article.
131

Id § 11A-3-19.
133
Id. § 11 A-3-23. Redemption from purchase; receipt; list of redemptions; lien; lien of
person redeeming interest of another; record.
(a) After the sale of any tax lien on any real estate pursuant to section five [§
11A-3-5] of this article, the owner of, or any other person who was entitled to
pay the taxes on, any real estate for which a tax lien on the real estate was
purchased by an individual may redeem at any time before a tax deed is
issued for the real estate. In order to redeem, he or she shall pay to the State
Auditor the following amounts:
(1) An amount equal to the taxes, interest, and charges due on the date of the
sale, with interest at the rate of one percent per month from the date of sale;
(2) All other taxes which have since been paid by the purchaser, his or her
heirs or assigns, with interest at the rate of one percent per month from the
date of payment;
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the beneficiaries were entitled to redeem the taxes, and therefore, entitled to
notice to redeem. 134 While agreeing with the result of the Court's decisions,
Shuman points out:
While I concur with the conclusion, I do not agree with the
avenue traveled to get there. The seminal case in modem taxsale jurisprudence is the decision rendered in Lilly v. Duke. In
Lilly, the very issue confronted by the court was "whether a
property owner or a mortgagee may be deprived of his property
interest without adequate notice prior to the sale of property at
a sheriffs sale for failure to pay taxes." While the focus and
facts in Lilly were different from those in Rollyson, and while
Lilly was decided before and was actually the impetus behind
the 1994 amendment and reenactment of the tax-sale scheme,
Lilly clearly and definitively stands for the proposition that a
lienholder, especially a secured party under a deed of trust, is a
party entitled to notice in just those types of circumstances
involved in Rollyson.13 5
Shuman also is critical of the Court's dictum in the Rollyson opinion
concerning the impact of the tax sale on existing deeds of trust.136
While the case of Subcarrier Communication, Inc. v. Nieldl3 7 was
decided by holding the statute prohibiting a sheriff from buying tax liens at tax
sales applied to tax sales in all counties, not just the county in which he/she

(3) Any additional expenses incurred from January I of the year following
the sheriffs sale to the date of redemption for the preparation of the list of
those to be served with notice to redeem and any written documentation used
for the preparation of the list, with interest at the rate of one percent per
month from the date of payment for reasonable legal expenses incurred for
the services of an attorney who has performed an examination of the title to
the real estate and rendered written documentation used for the preparation of
the list: Provided,That the maximum amount the owner or other authorized
person shall pay, excluding the interest, for the expenses incurred for the
person shall pay, excluding the interest, for the expenses incurred for the
preparation of the list of those to be served required by section nineteen of
this article is $300: Providedhowever, That the attorney may only charge a
fee for legal services actually performed and must certify that he or she
conducted an examination to determine the list of those to be served required
by section nineteen [§ 11 A-3-19] of this article; and
(4) All additional statutory costs paid by the purchaser.
Id§ 11A-3-23
134
See Rollyson, 518 S.E.2d at 378.
135
Shuman, Update, supra note 123, at 713-14 (footnotes omitted).
136
See id. at 717-18.
'3
624 S.E.2d 729 (W. Va. 2005).
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served as sheriff,'38 the facts of the case illustrate the need for a court's
oversight of what constitutes "reasonable diligence" in giving notice of a tax
sale.
The facts of the cases raise the issue of what a tax lien purchaser should
be required to do in order to gain information that would lead to being able to
give notice to the property owner.
While the case presented the issue of "whether the circuit court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of Subcarrier based upon its determination
that the defendants failed to make a reasonable inquiry to discover Subcarrier's
correct mailing address for the purpose of satisfying the notice requirements set
forth in W. Va.Code § 11A-3-22,"'39 the Court affirmed summary judgment on
other grounds. The Court held that Nield, the then Sheriff of Mineral County,
was precluded by Section 11A-3-6(a) of the West Virginia Code from
purchasing the tax lien encumbering the property1 40 at a tax sale in any of the
counties of West Virginia, i.e. the prohibition was not limited to the county in
which he served as sheriff.141
In Cogar v. Lafferty,142 the Court held that under the Uniform
Partnership Act, Sections 47B-1-1 to 47B-l 1-5 of the West Virginia Code, the
partnership entity that owns the property-not the individual partners-is the
owner or party entitled to notice to redeem pursuant to West Virginia Code
Section 11A-3-19(a).14 3

Id. at 735.
Id. at 734 (W. VA. CODE ANN. § 1 lA-3-22 (LexisNexis 1994) is entitled "Service of
Notice").
140
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 1IA-3-6 (LexisNexis 1994). Purchase by sheriff, State
Auditor,
deputy commissioner and clerk of county commission prohibited; co-owner free to purchase at
tax sale.
(a) A sheriff, clerk of the county commission or circuit court, assessor, State
Auditor, or deputy or assistant of any of them, shall not directly or indirectly
become the purchaser, or be interested in the purchase, of any tax lien on any
real estate at the tax sale or receive any tax deed conveying the real estate.
Any officer purchasing a tax lien shall forfeit $1,000 for each offense. The
sale of a tax lien on any real estate, or the conveyance of the real estate by tax
deed, to one of the officers named in this section is voidable, at the instance
of any person having the right to redeem, until the real estate reaches the
hands of a bona fide purchaser.
Id.
141
See Subcarrier Commc'n, Inc., 624 S.E.2d at 737. It is suggested that the editor should
read the Subcarrier opinion or Mr. Shuman's summary of the facts in his article to gain an
appreciation of the importance of the "due process" requirement in tax sales cases. See also
Shuman, Update, supra note 123, at 725-31.
142
639 S.E.2d 835 (W. Va. 2006).
13

139

143

In sum, we now hold that partners in a West Virginia general partnership as
defined by W. Va. Code § 47B-1-1 are not co-owners of partnership property
and have no interest in partnership property that entitles them to separate
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While there are undoubtedly situations when the taxpayer makes a
conscious decision that the value of the property does not justify the continued
payment of the taxes and permits the taxes to thus become delinquent, there are
also situations where the payment of the taxes "slips through the cracks."
Sometimes the lag time between the title transfer and the change of the owner's
name as it appears on the tax rolls 1" may contribute to the delinquency.
Sometimes the delinquency may relate to escrow arrangements, a refinancing,
or the payment in full of a loan which had an escrow feature for taxes. As the
following case illustrates, it is not unusual that the property as to which the
taxes go delinquent is improved and occupied, and the taxes go delinquent
because of some sort of mix-up.
In Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. UP Ventures II, LLC,145 the Halls
purchased the property at issue in 1995.146 Their property taxes became
delinquent for the 1998 taxes, and the tax lien was sold at the sheriffs tax sale
on November 9, 1999.147 Ironwood Acceptance Company purchased the tax
lien at the sheriffs tax sale for $1,565.81.14 The tax lien purchaser prepared
the notice to redeem pursuant to Section 1 IA-3-19(a) of the West Virginia
Code, and notice was mailed on January 17, 2001. The Halls received and
signed for the notice to redeem on January 22, 2001.149 After receiving the
notice to redeem, the Halls obtained a loan in the amount of $84,500, secured
by a deed of trust encumbering the property, from Fleet National Bank.150
Wells Fargo Bank was the successor in interest to Fleet National Bank.' 5 ' The
loan was closed and the loan documents were signed on February 21, 2001.152
The deed of trust was recorded on March 8, 2001. On May 8, 2001, the county

notice of the right to redeem partnership property that has been sold for
delinquent taxes. When property owned by a West Virginia general
partnership is sold for delinquent taxes, it is only necessary to serve notice of
the right to redeem as set forth in W. Va. Code § 1 A-3-19 upon the
partnership.
Id. at 839.
1" W. VA. CODE § llA-1-2 (LexisNexis 1994). Lien for real property taxes. "There shall be a
lien on all real property for the taxes assessed thereon, . . . which lien shall attach on the first day
of July, one thousand nine hundred sixty-one, and for each July first thereafter for the taxes
payablefor the ensuingfiscal year." Id. (emphasis added). West Virginia Code § 11-3-1 provides
"all property ... shall be assessed annually as of July 1." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-3-1
(LexisNexis 1994).
145
675 S.E.2d 883 (W. Va. 2009).
146
Id. at 884.
147
148
149
50
15
152

id.
id
id
Id. at 885.

Id
Id
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clerk delivered the tax deed to Ironwood who recorded the deed the same day
and then sold the property to Palo Verde Trading Company on August 13,
2001.s3 On September 9, 2003, Palo Verde conveyed the property to U P
Ventures, 11.154 The bank paid the real estate taxes on the property beginning in
the second half of 2001, and it continued to pay them through the second half
of 2006.155 Sometime in late 2006, Wells Fargo learned of the tax deed and on
January 11, 2007, filed suit to set aside the tax deed.15 6
As noted above, the loan was made and closed, and the deed of trust
encumbering the property as collateral for the loan was placed on record after
the Halls had signed for the notice to redeem on January 22, 2001.'"' Under the
statute, Section 11A-3-19(a) of the West Virginia Code, the tax lien purchaser
had to prepare the list of those entitled to notice of the right to redeem after
October 1 of the year following the sale (in this case after October 1, 2000),
and before December 31 of that same year (in this case December 31, 2000).158
In the instant case, the list had been provided to the clerk on November 16,
2000.' In holding that there was no duty on the part of the tax lien purchaser
to update or supplement the list of those parties entitled to notice to redeem
subsequent to November 16, the Court stated:
We therefore hold that under W. Va. Code § 11 A-3-19(a), a tax
sale purchaser is required to provide notice to parties who are
of record at any time after the thirty-first day of October of the
year following the sheriffs sale, and on or before the thirtyfirst day of December of the same year. W. Va. Code § 11 A-319(a)(1) does not require a tax sale purchaser to supplement
this list going forward to discover parties who became of
record after the thirty-first day of December of the year
following the sheriffs sale, or to provide additional
redemption notice before the tax deed is delivered.160
As to the three year statute of limitation to challenge the tax sale,161 the
Court stated:
153

Id

154

Id
Id
id

155
156

Id. at 884.
W. VA. CODE ANN. §11-3-19(a) (LexisNexis 1967).
15
675 S.E.2d at 884.
160
Id. at 888.
161
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11A-4-4 (LexisNexis 1994). Right to set aside deed when one
entitled to notice is not notified.
(a) If any person entitled to be notified under the provisions of section
twenty-two [§ 11A-3-22] or fifty-five [§ 1 IA-3-55], article three of this
157

158
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This Court finds that Shaffer's ruling with regard to the statute
of limitations was not overruled or modified by the Mennonite
or Lilly decisions. Consistent with this Court's interpretation of
W. Va.Code § I1A-3-32 [1931] in Shaffer v. Mareve Oil
Corp., a statute which is substantially similar to W. Va. Code
§ 11A-4-4(a) [1994], we hold the three-year statute of
limitation found in W. Va. Code § 11-4-4(a) [1994] relating to
the institution of a civil action to set aside a tax deed does not
violate the Due Process Clause of the West Virginia and United
States Constitutions.l62
The Court rejected an argument by the bank that the statute of
limitation should not start to run until the tax lien purchaser goes into actual
possession of the property acquired as a result of the tax sale on the basis of its
holding in Shaffer v. Mareve Oil Corp.16 3 While rejecting the argument on the
basis of the Shaffer decision, the Court did add:
A statute of limitation to set a time limit for instituting a suit to
set aside a tax deed is a policy matter for the Legislature to
decide. We note that had actual possession of the property by
the tax sale purchasers been required before the statute of
limitation was triggered, then all of the parties, including the
property owners and lienholders, would have had the
opportunity to contest the tax sale to set aside the tax deed. Our
current statutory scheme permits one to purchase land at a tax
sale, and who complies with the notice requirements of W. Va.

chapter is not served with the notice as therein required, and does not have
actual knowledge that such notice has been given to others in time to protect
his interests by redeeming the property, he, his heirs and assigns, may, before
the expiration of three years following the delivery of the deed, institute a
civil action to set aside the deed. No deed shall be set aside under the
provisions of this section until payment has been made or tendered to the
purchaser, or his heirs or assigns, of the amount which would have been
required for redemption, together with any taxes which have been paid on the
property since delivery of the deed, with interest at the rate of twelve percent
per annum.
(b) No title acquired pursuant to this article shall be set aside in the absence
of a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the person who originally
acquired such title failed to exercise reasonably diligent efforts to provide
notice of his intention to acquire such title to the complaining party or his
predecessors in title.
(c) Upon a preliminary finding by the court that the deed will be set aside
pursuant to this section, such amounts shall be paid within one month of the
entry thereof. Upon the failure to pay the same within said period or time, the
court shall upon the request of the purchaser, enter judgment dismissing the
action with prejudice.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11 A-4-4 (LexisNexis 1994).
162
Wells FargoBank N.A., 675 S.E.2d at 889 (internal citations omitted).
163
204 S.E.2d 404 (W. Va. 1974).
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Code § 11A-3-19(a), to remain silent until the three-year
statute of limitation period has run, and then take possession of
the property. If the Legislature required tax sale purchasers to
take actual possession before the statute of limitations began to
run, lawsuits like the one presently before us would not be
barred by W. Va. Code § 1IA-4-4(a) [1994].164
Additionally, the recent decision of Reynolds v. Hoke'6 5 provides
important guidance. The underlying facts in Reynolds involve property located
in Monroe County originally owned by Bill and Rose Reynolds.' 66 After the
taxes on the property became delinquent for the 2005 taxes, the tax lien was
sold at the sheriffs tax sale on October 24, 2006, to Jerry I. Hoke, Sr., for
$3,000.167 "The Sheriffs certificate of sale given to the purchaser listed
'REYNOLDS BILL ET UX' and 'BEVERLY HAYNES' as the taxpayers on
the subject property."' 68 The notice to redeem prepared pursuant to Section
1 1A-3-19(a) of the West Virginia was mailed to Bill and Rose Reynolds and
Beverly Haynes, and the published notice to redeem was addressed to "Bill
Reynolds and Rose Reynolds, The Unknown Heirs and Creditors of Bill
Reynolds and Rose Reynolds." 6 9 The certified mail containing the notice of
the right to redeem that was mailed to Bill and Rose Reynolds and to Beverly
Haynes were all signed for by Beverly Haynes.' 70 When the property was not
redeemed, the Clerk of the County Commission of Monroe County, on April
15, 2008, conveyed the land to the tax lien purchaser, Hoke, by tax deed.171 On
June 23, 2008, the plaintiffs, Anna Reynolds and Earl J. Reynolds, the
successors in interest of Beverly Haynes, filed suit to set aside the tax deed.172
The plaintiffs'claim to the property was derived from a quitclaim deed
executed by Beverly Haynes pursuant to a settlement agreement resolving a
lawsuit involving the Estate of Bill Reynolds that had been filed in Boone
County.'73 Although the civil action had been filed and settled in Boone
County, the quit claim deed had been recorded in Monroe County on June 7,
2006, the situs of the subject property.' 74 As noted above, the tax sale occurred
16

16s
166

167
168
169
170
171
172

Wells FargoBank N.A., 675 S.E.2d at 890 (citations omitted).
702 S.E.2d 629 (W. Va. 2011).
See id.
Id. at 630.
id.
Id.
id
Id at 630-31.
Id. at 631.

17
Id. Although it is not clear from the reported decision how Beverly Haynes obtained her
interest in the subject property, it is assumed she was an heir of Bill Reynolds.
174
id
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subsequently on October 24, 2006.s15 The essence of the tax lien purchaser's
answer to the suit was that he had complied with the requirements of Section
11A-3-19(a) of the West Virginia Code in as much as plaintiffs were not
owners of record of the property.'7 6 The circuit court bought into the argument
of the tax lien purchaser:
Specifically, the circuit court found in its order that pursuant to
W. Va. Code § 11 A-4-4(b) [1994], the appellants must prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the appellee did not
exercise reasonably diligent efforts to provide them with notice
of their right to redeem the property. According to the circuit
court, the appellants were not reasonably identifiable from the
records in the clerk's office. The circuit court explained that
the appellants' quitclaim deed was not indexed under the name
of Bill Reynolds or Rose Reynolds or indexed in such a
manner as to allow a title examiner to determine that an
interest in lands owned by Bill Reynolds and Rose Reynolds
was being conveyed to another person. Furthermore, reasoned
the circuit court, there were no probate or other records filed in
the clerk's office giving notice to any interested person of the
pendency of an estate for Bill Reynolds and Rose Reynolds.
Moreover, the circuit court found that the burden is on the
person seeking to protect himself or herself against the claims
of others to see that all of the prerequisites of a valid and
complete recordation are complied with. The circuit court
concluded that the appellants failed to do this by not having
their quitclaim deed indexed in such a manner as to give
constructive notice to third parties of the appellants' interest in
the subject property. 7
In overruling the summary judgment granted by the circuit court in favor of the
tax sale purchaser, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia first
borrowed a definition for "reasonable diligence":
Black's Law Dictionary 523 (9th ed.2009) [sic], defines
"reasonable diligence" as "[a] fair degree of diligence expected
from someone of ordinary prudence under circumstances like
those at issue." As noted above, the circuit court found that the
appellants failed to show a lack of reasonable diligence on the
part of the appellee. According to the circuit court, the

175 Id. at 630.
116
See id. at 631.
177
Id. (footnote omitted).
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appellants were not reasonably identifiable from the records in
the clerk's office. We disagree with the circuit court.17 1
Next, the Court said:
As set forth above, upon purchasing the tax lien on the subject
property, the appellee received a certificate of sale from the
sheriff which listed the names of both Bill Reynolds and
Beverly Haynes as taxpayers of the property that was
delinquent for the taxes. The appellee mailed a notice of the
right to redeem the subject property to Bill Reynolds and he
searched the public records in the county clerk's office for any
deed transfers indexed under the name of Bill Reynolds. The
appellee also mailed a notice of the right to redeem to Beverly
Haynes. Significantly, the appellee failed to search the public
records in the county clerk's office for deed transfers indexed
under the name of Beverly Haynes who was listed as a
taxpayer on the property in the certificate of sale given to the
appellee. If the appellee had done so, he would have
discovered the February 8, 2006 quitclaim deed conveying the
subject property by Beverly Haynes to the appellants and filed
in the county clerk's office on June 7, 2006. Because Beverly
Haynes' name appeared as a taxpayer on the certificate of sale
received by the appellee upon purchasing the tax lien for the
subject property, this Court finds as a matter of law that
reasonable diligence required that a search of the public
records in the county clerk's office be made to determine
whether there were any deed transfers indexed under the name
of Beverly Haynes.
Further, the appellants' deed was of record in the county
clerk's office during the applicable time period as having
received the subject property by quitclaim deed from Beverly
Haynes. Consequently, the appellee was charged with
exercising reasonable diligence to provide notice to the
appellants of their right to redeem the property. Moreover,
there is evidence in the record that the sheriffs office assessed
the appellants for taxes on the subject property for the year
2007. Specifically, the record contains a statement of taxes due
for the year 2007 sent by the Sheriff of Monroe County to the
appellants. Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11A-3-23(a) (1998),
"the owner of, or any otherperson who was entitled to pay the
taxes on, any real estate for which a tax lien thereon was
purchased by an individual may redeem at any time before a

178

Id. at 632.
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tax deed is issued for the real estate." Therefore, also as
persons entitled to pay taxes on the property, the appellants can
redeem the property.
In sum, this Court finds as a matter of law that reasonable
diligence required the appellee to search the public records in
the county clerk's office for any deed transfers indexed under
the name of Beverly Haynes in light of the fact that Beverly
Haynes' name appeared as a taxpayer on the certificate of sale
issued by the sheriff to the appellee after the appellee
purchased the tax lien on the subject property. Because the
appellee failed to conduct such a search, we conclude that the
appellee failed to exercise reasonably diligent efforts to
provide notice of the right of redemption of the subject
property to the appellants. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit
court's grant of summary judgment on behalf of the appellee,
and we remand this case to the circuit court for proceedings
consistent with our holding herein and for the court to permit
the appellants to comply with W.Va. Code § 11A-4-4(a) and
Although the Court analyzed the tax lien purchaser's efforts in the
context of the statutory duty of reasonable diligence,so the same type of
analysis should be used to scrutinize such efforts in the context of determining
whether due process was afforded. 8 1
VII. THE PLEMONS V. GALE TRILOGY
The three reported decisions in Plemons v. Gale'82 illustrate the crux of
the issue. As Judge Goodwin notes in his opinion following the remand of the
case by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, his original finding and holding
was "the defendants made no further efforts to locate Ms. Plemons after the
initial notices were returned as undeliverable." 83 Doing nothing, as we shall
see in Jones v. Flowers,184 fails to satisfy due process. What constitutes
Id. at 632-33 (footnotes omitted).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11 A-4-4(b) (LexisNexis 1994).
181 See Citizens Nat'l Bank of St. Albans v. Dunnaway, 400 S.E.2d 888, 892 (W. Va.
1990)
("A thread running through all the United States Supreme Court notice cases, beginning with
Mullane, is the mandate that under the due process clause a reasonable effort must be made to
provide actual notice of an event that may significantly affect a legally protected property
interest.").
182
396 F.3d 569 (4th Cir. 2004); 382 F. Supp. 2d 826 (S.D. W. Va. 2005); 298 F. Supp. 2d
380 (S.D. W. Va. 2004).
179

18o

183

382 F. Supp. 2d at 828.

184

547 U.S. 220 (2006).
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"reasonable efforts," on the facts of a particular case, is what the court must
determine in order to know whether due process has been satisfied. It's
important to keep this point in mind in reading Ms. Plemon's trial.
In January of 2003, Linda Plemons learned that property she had
purchased with Jerry Lipscomb, her business partner, had been sold for
taxes. 8 5 Ms. Plemons had refinanced the property in February 2000, and she
thought the bank was to pay the real estate taxes through an escrow account.
In fact, neither the bank nor Ms. Plemons was paying the taxes, and on
November 13, 2000, the Sheriff of Kanawha County sold the tax lien on the
property at the sheriffs tax sale to Advantage 99TD.'87 Pursuant to the
statutory requirement, the tax sale purchaser provided the names and addresses
for those to receive notice to redeem to the clerk of the county commission. 88
The notices were mailed to the names and addresses provided by certified mail,
and all of the notices were returned as not delivered.'8 9 After the notices were
returned to the clerk, notice to redeem was published in two local newspapers
on two separate occasions during April 2002.190 When the parties did not
redeem, the clerk issued the tax deed for the property to Advantage, and
Advantage recorded the deed.' 9 ' On November 22, 2002, Advantage sold the
property by a quitclaim deed to Douglas Q. Gale, which was also recorded. 92
Ms. Plemons filed suit in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County to set aside the
tax deed, and the defendants removed the case to the federal court on the basis
of diversity jurisdiction. 93
Following removal to the federal court, Judge Goodwin granted the
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.194 Recognizing the inherent conflict
of interest of the tax lien purchased, Judge Goodwin held:
Section 11 A-4-4 of the West Virginia Code allows an
interested party to set aside a tax sale deed if that party proves
by clear and convincing evidence that the tax sale purchaser

185
116

Plemons, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 383.
Id. at 382.

187

Id

188

id

"

Id. at 381-82.
Id at 383.
Id.

'9
191
192

id

See id at 381-83. This summary of facts should be sufficient for present purposes.
However, a reading of the three reported decisions in Plemons v. Gale and the discussion in Mr.
Shuman's updated article is strongly recommended. See Plemons v. Gale, 396 F.3d 569 (4th Cir.
2004); Plemons v. Gale, 382 F. Supp. 2d 826 (S.D. W. Va. 2005); Plemons v. Gale, 298 F. Supp.
2d 380 (S.D. W. Va. 2004); see also Shuman, Update, supra, note 124.
193

19

Plemons, 298 F. Supp.2d at 390.
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failed to give constitutionally adequate notice. In the tax sale
context, notice is constitutionally adequate when the purchaser
makes a reasonably diligent effort to provide the interested
party with actual notice prior to the issuance of a tax sale deed.
When notice sent by certified mail is returned unclaimed, the
reasonable diligence standard requires the purchaser to make
further inquiry reasonably calculated to locate the interested
party's correct address. After all notices mailed to Ms.
Plemons were returned unclaimed, Advantage failed to make
any further inquiry as to her correct address. Therefore, the
court FINDS that Ms. Plemons has proven by clear and
convincing evidence that Advantage failed to provide her with
constitutionally adequate notice, and that, under § 11 A-4-4, she
is entitled to set aside the tax sale deed now held by
Advantage's successor in interest, Douglas Q. Gale. Pursuant
to West Virginia Code § 11 A-4-4, the court ORDERS that
Gale's deed to the subject property be set aside after Ms.
Plemons tenders payment of the amount required for
redemption, the amount of any taxes paid on the subject
property since the transfer of the deed, and interest at the rate
of twelve percent per annum. The court GRANTS the
plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment .... 195
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that upon the
return of the certified mail undelivered that some follow up was necessary
stating:
As all of these cases recognize, initial reasonable efforts to
mail notice to one threatened with loss of property will
normally satisfy the requirements of due process. However,
when prompt return of an initial mailing makes clear that the
original effort at notice has failed, the party charged with
notice must make reasonable efforts to learn the correct

1
Id. As to the burden of proof which the court had discussed earlier in the decision, the court
explained:
Therefore, the court FINDS that § 11 A-4-4(b) allows a plaintiff to set aside a
tax sale deed when she proves by clear and convincing evidence that the tax
lien purchaser failed to give constitutionally adequate notice. In so finding,
the court expresses no opinion as to the propriety of either placing the burden
of proof on the plaintiff or requiring that the plaintiff prove failure to give
constitutionally adequate notice by clear and convincing evidence.
Resolution of these burden of proof issues would require the court to address
"questions of a constitutional nature" which are not "necessary to a decision
of the case." As is discussed in detail below, Ms. Plemons has proven by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendants' attempt to provide her
with notice fails to satisfy the requirements of due process.
Id. at 385-86 (citations omitted) (quoting Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905)).
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address before constructive notice will be deemed sufficient.
"A reasonable person presented with a letter that has been
returned to sender will ordinarily attempt to resend it if it is
practicable to do so." Thus, the district court properly held that
the reasonable diligence standard mandated by Mullane and its
progeny required some followup effort here.' 96
While the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the return of
undelivered certified mail necessitated some follow-up, it disagreed with the
district court as to the type of follow-up required.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' view of what needed to be done
was summed up as follows:
Accordingly, reasonable diligence required Advantage to
search all publicly available county records once the prompt
return of the mailings made clear that its initial examination of
the title to the Echo Road property had not netted Plemons'
correct address. Unfortunately, the record in this case does not
disclose what efforts, if any, Advantage made to search public
documents, or whether Plemons' proper address would have
been ascertainable from such a search. Thus, we must remand
the case to the district court for resolution of these questions.19 7
Upon remand, the district court followed the directions of the Fourth
Circuit and concluded:
The defendants have recently re-examined the publicly
available county records in preparation for their pending
motion for summary judgment. The defendants' motion
contends that Ms. Plemons' correct address, namely, 405
Quarry Pointe, has never appeared in the public records, and
Ms. Plemons does not dispute this assertion. Accordingly, I
conclude that her address was not "ascertainable" by a search
of the public records after the mailings were returned as
undeliverable. I therefore FIND that no genuine issue of
material fact remains and GRANT the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. 198
While following the mandate of the Fourth Circuit to resolve the case,
Judge Goodwin added:

196 Plemons, 396 F.3d at 576, 579 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Small v. United States, 136 F.3d
1334, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
'
Id. at 578.
198
Plemons v. Gale, 382 F. Supp. 2d 826, 828 (S.D. W. Va. 2005).
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I have followed the instruction of the Court of Appeals as set
out above and found the facts required to answer the two
inquiries it posed. Having done so, I have entered summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. Although I have disposed
of this dispute by final order in accordance with the law as
announced by the Court of Appeals, I continue this writing to
express my respectful, and, I trust, principled disagreement
with certain aspects of the Fourth Circuit's opinion.199
As Judge Goodwin noted:
In my prior opinion, I ultimately found it unnecessary to reach
the question of whether Advantage acted reasonably because
after the mailed notice was returned unclaimed, Advantage
took no action. Advantage made no further inquiry prior to
publishing notice. Inaction in the face of a constitutional
requirement of reasonably diligent efforts could not, I thought,
satisfy the requirements of the due process.oo
It is important to keep in mind that both the district court and the circuit
court of appeals in Plemons agreed that upon the return of the certified mail
undelivered, some additional action, beyond notice by publication, was
necessary. The difference was as to what additional steps needed to be taken.
A year after the Plemons decision was resolved on remand, the United
States Supreme Court addressed essentially the same issue in Jones v.
Flowers.2 0 1 The Jones case involved the sale of Jones's property for the
nonpayment of taxes under Arkansas law.202 Jones had purchased the property
in 1967 and paid the mortgage, which included an escrow for taxes, for thirty
years.203 For thirty years, the mortgage company paid the taxes.204 In 1993,
Jones and his wife separated.205 She remained in the house, and he moved out
and into an apartment.20 6 In 1997, when the mortgage was paid off, the taxes
became delinquent.20 7 In April 2000, the Commission of State Lands mailed
notice of his tax delinquency by certified mail to Jones at the address of the

Id. at 828-29. It is suggested the reader pay particular attention to pages 829-31 of the
'99
opinion.
200
Id. at 831.
201
547 U.S. 220 (2006).
202

204

See id.
Id at 223.
id

205

id.

203

206

207

id.
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house.20 8 The letter was returned "unclaimed."20 9 Pursuant to the Arkansas
statute, two years later the Commission of State Lands published notice of a
public sale, and when no bids were submitted, the State negotiated a private
sale of the property. 210
Again, a certified letter was mailed to Jones at the house address
stating that the property would be sold to the purchaser, Flowers, if he did not
pay his taxes. 1 Again, this letter was returned marked "unclaimed." 2 12
Immediately after the thirty day period of post-sale redemption passed, Flowers
had an unlawful detainer notice delivered to the property. 213 This notice was
served on Jones's daughter who then notified him of the tax sale.2 14 Jones filed
suit seeking to set aside the tax deed on the basis that his property had been
taken without due process. 215 The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of the Commissioner and Flowers, and the summary judgment was
216
upheld by the Arkansas Supreme Court.
The Court stated the issue as "whether the Due Process Clause requires
the government to take additional reasonable steps to notify a property owner
when notice of a tax sale is returned undelivered." 2 17
In answer, the Court stated:
We hold that when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned
unclaimed, the State must take additional reasonable steps to
attempt to provide notice to the property owner before selling
his property, if it is practicable to do so. Under the
circumstances presented here, additional reasonable steps were
available to the State. We therefore reverse the judgment of the
Arkansas Supreme Court.218

208

id

209

Id. at 224.

210

id

211

Id.
id

212
213

id
See id.
215
Id
216
id
217
Id. Later in the decision, the Court said: "But we have never addressed whether due
process entails further responsibility when the government becomes aware prior to the taking that
its attempt at notice has failed. That is a new wrinkle, and we have explained that the 'notice
required will vary with circumstances and conditions."' Id. at 227 (quoting Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956)). "The question presented is whether such knowledge on
the government's part is a 'circumstance and condition' that varies the 'notice required."' Id.
218
Id. at 225. Later in the majority opinion, the Court explained:
214
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The State's duty is nicely summarized by the Court as follows:
As for Mullane, it directs that "when notice is a person's
due.. . [t]he means employed must be such as one desirous of
actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to
accomplish it." Mindful of the dissent's concerns, we
conclude, at the end of the day, that someone who actually
wanted to alert Jones that he was in danger of losing his house
would do more when the attempted notice letter was returned
unclaimed, and there was more that reasonably could be
done.2 19
As to what steps the State should take, the Court said:
As noted, "[i]t is not our responsibility to prescribe the form of
service that the [government] should adopt." In prior cases
finding notice inadequate, we have not attempted to redraft the
State's notice statute. The State can determine how to proceed
in response to our conclusion that notice was inadequate here,
and the States have taken a variety of approaches to the present
question. It suffices for present purposes that we are confident
that additional reasonable steps were available for Arkansas to
employ before taking Jones' property.2 20
Near the end of its opinion, the majority stated:
There is no reason to suppose that the State will ever be less
than fully zealous in its efforts to secure the tax revenue it
needs. The same cannot be said for the State's efforts to ensure
that its citizens receive proper notice before the State takes
action against them. In this case, the State is exerting
extraordinary power against a property owner-taking and
selling a house he owns. It is not too much to insist that the
We do not think that a person who actually desired to inform a real property
owner of an impending tax sale of a house he owns would do nothing when a
certified letter sent to the owner is returned unclaimed.... [W]hen a letter is
returned by the post office, the sender will ordinarily attempt to resend it, if it
is practicable to do so. This is especially true when, as here, the subject
matter of the letter concerns such an important and irreversible prospect as
the loss of a house. Although the State may have made a reasonable
calculation of how to reach Jones, it had good reason to suspect when the
notice was returned that Jones was "no better off than if the notice had never
been sent." Deciding to take no further action is not what someone "desirous
of actually informing" Jones would do; such a person would take further
reasonable steps if any were available.
Id. at 229-230 (citations omitted) (citing Malone v. Robinson, 614 A.2d 33, 37 (D.C. 1992)).
219
Id. at 238 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315

(1950)).
220

Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 n.9 (1982)).
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State do a bit more to attempt to let him know about it when
the notice letter addressed to him is returned unclaimed.22 1
Thus, the Court held that "[t]he Commissioner's effort to provide
notice to Jones of an impending tax sale of his house was insufficient to satisfy
due process given the circumstances of this case."m The Court reversed the
judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court and remanded the case for further
proceedings. 2 23 As the Court in Jones noted, "[b]ecause additional reasonable
steps were available to the State, given the circumstances here, the
Commission's effort to provide notice to Jones was insufficient to satisfy due
process. What is reasonable in response to new information depends on what
that information reveals." 224
This statement clearly recognizes a case specific test, and given the fact
the West Virginia statute "assigns" this duty to the tax lien purchaser, the
importance of the Court's oversight on a case by case basis is apparent.
VIII.THE NEED OF TAx REVENUES
As noted above, the State has a legitimate concern with respect to the
collection of taxes on real estate. The rewrite of the "tax laws" in 1994 begins
with a "Declaration of legislative purpose and policy." 225 Among the stated
purpose of the article are: "(1) To provide for the speedy and expeditious
enforcement of the tax claims of the state and its subdivisions; (2) to provide
for the transfer of delinquent and nonentered lands to those more responsible
to, or better able to bear, the duties of citizenship than were the former
owners." 226

221

Id at 239.

222

id

223

224

id.
Id at 221-22.

225

W. VA.

226

Section I lA-3-1 of the West Virginia Code provides:
In view of the paramount necessity of providing regular tax income for the
state, county and municipal governments, particularly for school purposes;
and in view of the further fact that delinquent land not only constitutes a
public liability, but also represents a failure on the part of delinquent private
owners to bear a fair share of the costs of government; and in view of the
rights of owners of real property to adequate notice and an opportunity for
redemption before they are divested of their interests in real property for
failure to pay taxes or have their property entered on the landbooks; and in
view of the fact that the circuit court suits heretofore provided prior to deputy
commissioners' sales are unncecessary and a burden on the judiciary of the
state; and in view of the necessity to continue the mechanism for the
disposition of escheated and waste and unappropriated lands; now therefore,
the Legislature declares that its purposes in the enactment of this article are
as follows: (1) To provide for the speedy and expeditious enforcement of the
tax claims of the state and its subdivisions; (2) to provide for the transfer of

CODE ANN.

§ 1IA-3-1 (LexisNexis 1994).
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In fact, Judge Niemeyer in his dissent in Plemons quoted the above
portion of the West Virginia statute.22 7 A more sharply worded statement is
found in Justice Thomas's dissent in Jones v. Flowers where he wrote:
The meaning of the Constitution should not turn on the antics
of tax evaders and scofflaws. Nor is the self-created
conundrum in which petitioner finds himself a legitimate
ground for imposing additional obligations on the State. The
State's attempts to notify petitioner by certified mail at the
address that he provided and, additionally, by publishing notice
228
in a local newspaper satisfy due process.
It is important to keep in mind that not every tax sale involves "tax
evaders and scofflaws." For example, in the Wells Fargo Bank case, the taxes
were delinquent for the 1998 taxes and sold at the sheriffs sale on November
9, 1999.229 Wells Fargo was the successor in interest to Fleet National Bank,
and "paid the real estate taxes due on the property beginning in the second half
of 2001 and continuing through the second half of 2006."230 It was in the late
fall or early winter of 2006 that the bank learned of the 1999 tax sale, and it
filed suit in January 2007 to set aside the tax deed.231 In the Subcarrier
Communication case, Subcarrier notified the Preston County Clerk of its
change of address and phone number after its purchase of the property from
Skyline Communications.2 32 Six months later, when Subcarrier was forwarded
the notice of delinquency which had been mailed to its former address, it
advised the sheriff in writing of its new address.233 In addition, the check
tendered in payment of the taxes bore the correct mailing address.234 In spite of
delinquent and nonentered lands to those more responsible to, or better able
to bear, the duties of citizenship than were the former owners; (3) to secure
adequate notice to owners of delinquent and nonentered property of the
pending issuance of a tax deed; (4) to permit deputy commissioner of
delinquent and nonentered lands to sell such lands without the necessity of
proceedings in the circuit courts; (5) to reduce the expense and burden on the
state and its subdivisions of tax sales so that such sales may be conducted in
an efficient manner while respecting the due process rights of owners of real
property; and (6) to provide for the disposition of escheated and waste and
unappropriated lands.
Id.
227
228
229

See Plemons v. Gale, 396 F.3d 569, 578 (4th Cir. 2004).
Jones, 547 U.S. at 248-249 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. UP Ventures II, LLC, 675 S.E.2d 883 (W. Va. 2009).

230

id

231

233

See id at 885.
Subcarrier Commc'ns, Inc. v. Nield, 624 S.E.2d 729, 731 (W. Va. 2005).
Id. at 732.

234

id.

232
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these efforts on the part of the taxpayer, the next year's taxes were again mailed
to the old address, and since the mail forwarding order had expired, it was
returned to the sheriff stamped "undeliverable, forwarding order expired." 235
The recent decision in Rebuild America, Inc. v. Davis236 reversed a
lower court's decision to set aside a tax deed for failure to comply with the
notice of hearing requirement as set forth in the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure.2 37
Even though the case was reversed on grounds of failure to properly
"notice" the hearing, the decision does provide important insight into tax
sales.238 As to tax sales for the nonpayment of taxes, the Court explained that
there were two notices to be given to the delinquent taxpayer.239 The first notice
is given by a sheriff before selling a tax lien at public auction, as provided for
by West Virginia statutory provisions.240 As to the "pre-sale" notices, the Court
explained that the sheriff must:
(1) [P]ublish a list of delinquent real estate as a Class I-0
advertisement,
(2) make a second publication of delinquent real estate as a
Class 111-0 legal advertisement, with this notice stating that the
tax lien for the delinquent taxes would be sold at public auction
at a time, date and place specified in the notice,.. . and
(3) mail a certified letter to the landowner, and others specified
by statute, of the tax delinquency and that the tax lien for that
delinquency will be sold at public auction at a certain date,
time, and place, unless the delinquency is redeemed[.] 24 1

235

Id
726 S.E.2d 396 (W. Va. 2012).
237
The West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
(b) Motions and other papers(1) An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless
made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing, shall state with
particularity the grounds therefore, and shall set forth the relief or order
sought. The requirement of writing is fulfilled if the motion is stated in a
written notice of the hearing of the motion.
(2) The rules applicable to captions and other matters of form of pleadings
apply to all motions and other papers provided for by these rules.
(3) All motions shall be signed in accordance with Rule 11.
W. VA. R. Civ. P. 7.
238
See RebuildAm., Inc., 726 S.E.2d 396.
239
Id. at 402.
240
id
241
Id. (citing W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11 A-2-13 (LexisNexis 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
3-2 (LexisNexis 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11 A-3-2(b) (LexisNexis 2007)).
236
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The Court went on to say that "the second category of notices are those
required to be made after sale of tax lien. In the second category (post-sale
notices), three additional notices are required...."242 In relation to this "postsale" category, the Court noted that "these additional notices are required where
the delinquent property is classified as Class II property2 43 at the time of the
assessment."244
The Court explained:
(1) that the sheriff, within one month of the sale of a tax lien at
public auction, make a Class 11-0 publication of the tax lien
sale, notifying the landowner, and other persons or entities
entitled to notice, that they could still pay the taxes and redeem
the property,
(2) that the Clerk prepare and serve a notice to redeem. The
notice to redeem informs the landowner, and others entitled by
statute to notice, that a tax deed had been requested by the tax
lien purchaser, but that the landowner and others still had the
right to redeem the property by paying the amounts due by the
time specified in the notice. The notice to redeem also informs
the landowner, and others, that if the delinquent taxes are not
redeemed by the time set forth in the notice, a tax deed would
be delivered to the purchaser of the tax lien., and
(3)that the Clerk, when the tax delinquency is for real property
that was classified as residential at the time of assessment,
forward a copy of the notice to redeem by first class mail to the
physical address of the property and addressed to

"Occupant."2 4 5

As to the pre-sale notice required by Section 11A-3-2(b) of the West
Virginia Code, the Court explained that the same Code sections also provides:
"In no event shall failure to receive the mailed notice by the landowner or
lienholder affect the validity of the title of the property conveyed if it is

242

id.

Section § 11-8-5 of the West Virginia Code classified class II property as: "Class II. All
property owned, used and occupied by the owner exclusively for residential purposes; All farms,
including land used for horticulture and grazing, occupied and cultivated by their owners or bona
fide tenants ..... W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-8-5 (LexisNexis 1961).
244
Rebuild Am., Inc., 726 S.E.2d at 402.
245
Id. at 402-03 (citations omitted).
243
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conveyed pursuant to section twenty-seven [§ 11A-3-27] or fifty-nine [§ 11 A3-59] of this Article." 24 6
As to the facts in the case before it, the Court said:
The Legislature could not have more plainly stated its intenta tax deed will not be set aside on the ground that a landowner
or lienholder did not receive the Sheriffs pre-sale tax lien
notice (sent by certified mail) if the post-sale redemption
notice was properly served, and the statutory process was
followed when conveying the tax deed. As opposed to the
arguments made by Huntington Bank and the Davises, the real
issue that the trial court needed to determine was whether the
post-sale statutory process was followed and the tax deed for
the Davises' property conveyed pursuant to W. Va. Code §
11A-3-27.24 7

Section 11A-3-27 of the West Virginia Code provides that a tax deed
will not be delivered unless the post-sale notice to redeem was properly served
and, despite such service, the property was not redeemed. In fact, the form deed
contained in Section 27 states:
Whereas, The [Clerk] has caused the notice to redeem to be
served on all persons required by law to be served therewith;
and
Whereas, the tax lien(s) on the real estate so purchased has not
been redeemed in the manner provided by law and the time for
redemption set in such notice has expired[.] 2 48
Section 1 1A-3-22 of the West Virignia Code specifies the method that
must be used in serving the notice to redeem. 2 49 Subsection (b), which is
applicable to the facts of this case, states:
The notice shall be served upon all persons residing or found in
the state in the manner provided for serving process
commencing a civil action or by certified mail, return receipt
requested. The notice shall be served on or before the thirtieth
day following the request for the notice.250

246
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 1IA-3-2 (LexisNexis 2007). Section II A-3-27 of the West Virginia
Code refers to the sheriffs sale tax deed and Section 11A-3-59 refers to the deputy's
commissioner's sale. Id. § 1lA-3-27, -59.
247
Rebuild Am., Inc., 726 S.E.2d at 403 (citations omitted).
248

W. VA. CODE ANN.

249

Id. § 1 1A-3-22.

250

id

§ 11A-3-27

(LexisNexis 2010).
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The Court found that, "[c]ontrary to Huntington Bank's and the Davises'
argument, it is the post-sale notice to redeem that is the relevant inquiry in a
lawsuit filed under West Virginia Code section 11A-4-4, and not one of the
pre-sale notices."251
The Court's comment in footnote 13 is also significant. At the end of
the Court's discussion concerning "notices," as discussed above, the footnote
reads: "The fact that the statutory tax sale may have been followed does not
mean that constitutional due process has been satisfied. However, the Davises
and Huntington Bank have not raised a 'due process' violation." 2 52 Taking the
Court's discussion of "notices" and the comment of the footnote together, what
the Court was stating is that the total procedure involved in the taking of an
individual's property for the nonpayment of or nonentry for taxes must comply
with the due process requirement. Due process requires both a statutory
procedure that satisfies the due process requirement as well as the application
of that procedure to the particular set of facts involved in a manner that affords
or reasonably attempts to afford the property owner of notice prior to the taking

of his property.253
Finally, the Court in Rebuild America, Inc. addressed the burden of
proof and noted:
Our law is clear that in a suit for cancellation of a tax deed, the
tax deed grantee has the burden of proving compliance with the
statutory steps required, including the validity of statutory
notice of application for tax deed.

. .

. Our law is also clear that

Rebuild Am., Inc., 726 S.E.2d at 404. As to the importance of the Court discussion
regarding setting aside the tax deed, later in the opinion the Court stated:
While we reverse the trial court's order for the reasons discussed above, we
also note that we would have been compelled to reverse on the basis of a
procedural error involving the manner in which the tax deed was set aside.
W. Va. Code § 11 A-4-4, identifies a specific procedure that trial courts must
follow when a tax deed is to be set aside, which includes making a
preliminary finding before setting aside a tax deed. The trial court did not
make a preliminary finding.
Reviewing the statutorily proscribed procedure, we hold that before a trial
court may enter a final order setting aside a tax deed pursuant to W. Va.
Code § 11A-4-4 [1994], the trial court must make a preliminary finding that
the tax deed will be set aside if, within thirty days of the entry of the
preliminary finding, there is paid or tendered to the tax deed purchaser, or his
heirs or assigns: (1) the amount of money that would have been required to
redeem the property, (2) the amount of real estate taxes paid on the property
since delivery of the deed, and (3) interest at the rate of twelve percent per
annum. If these amounts are not paid or tendered to the tax deed purchaser
within thirty days of entry of the preliminary findings, the trial court, upon
the request of the tax deed purchaser, must enter an order dismissing the case
seeking to set aside the tax deed.
Id. at 406 (footnotes omitted).
252
Id at 403 n.13.
253
See generally id.
251
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"[t]he owner cannot be deprived of his land by sale thereof for
taxes unless the procedure prescribed by the statute, strictly
construed, is substantially complied with."
On remand, Rebuild/REO-whichever of the two is the actual
grantee of the tax deed-must prove that it followed the
specific requirements set forth in W. Va. Code § 11A-3-19 ...
and that the notices to redeem were properly served as
required by W. Va. Code § 11A-3-22(b) [2007].254
IX. JUDGE GOODWIN AND JUSTICE KETCHUM GOT IT RIGHT

On the facts of the case, the Court, in my opinion, reached the correct
result in the Wells FargoBank case. In that case, the property owners received
and signed for the notices to redeem and took no action to redeem.255 After
receiving the notice to redeem, they made the arrangements to borrow $84,500
from Fleet National Bank, closed the loan, and the deed of trust was
recorded.2 56 While upholding the tax lien purchaser's title, the Court noted that
the Legislature had established the terms of the statute of limitation. "If the
Legislature required tax sale purchasers to take actual possession before the

Id. at 404-05 (citations omitted) (quoting Syl. pt. 1, Koontz v. Ball, 122 S.E. 461, 461 (W.
Va. 1924)). Although not explicitly referring to it, the court's statement of the burden of proof
appears to be inconsistent with Section 11A-4-4(b) of the West Virginia Code which reads:
no title acquired pursuant to this article shall be set aside in the absence of a
showing by clear and convincing evidence that the person who originally
acquired such title failed to exercise reasonably diligent efforts to provide
notice of his intention to acquire such title to the complaining party or his
predecessors in title.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11A-4-4(b) (Lexis Nexis 1994). However, the court's statement as to the
burden of proof is consistent with Judge Goodwin's statement in the first Plemons v. Gale
opinion regarding Section 11 A-4-4(b) of the West Virginia Code. Judge Goodwin wrote:
Therefore, the court FINDS that § l -A-4-4(b) allows a plaintiff to set aside
a tax sale deed when she proves by clear and convincing evidence that the tax
lien purchaser failed to give constitutionally adequate notice. In so finding,
the court expresses no opinion as to the propriety of either placing the burden
of proof on the plaintiff or requiring that the plaintiff prove failure to give
constitutionally adequate notice by clear and convincing evidence.
Resolution of these burden of proof issues would require the court to address
"questions of a constitutional nature" which are not "necessary to a decision
of the case." As is discussed in detail below, Ms. Plemons has proven by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendants' attempt to provide her
with notice fails to satisfy the requirements of due process.
Plemons v. Gale, 298 F. Supp. 2d 380, 385-86 (citations omitted) (quoting Burton v. United
States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905)).
255
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. UP Ventures II, LLC, 675 S.E.2d 883 (W. Va. 2009).
256
Id. at 885 (citations omitted). Assuming that Fleet Bank required a title report in order to
obtain the loan, the title examiner should have ascertained that the real estate taxes had not been
paid and were not current.
254
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statute of limitation began to run, lawsuits like the one presently before us
would not be barred by W. Va. Code § I 1A-4-4(a) [1994].",257
Such a statutory provision would provide a "solution" in a significant
majority of the cases where there was an inadvertent failure to pay the property
taxes. However, such a provision would not be as well suited to mineral
interests or vacant lands (such as mountain acreage) where the tax liens were
sold and purchased.258 Therefore, such an amendment to the statute of
limitation would not totally replace the need for the Court's oversight to
prevent a tax sale purchaser from "gaming the procedure." Judge Goodwin's
admonition in Plemons is well-founded. Following the remand from the Fourth
Circuit, Judge Goodwin repeated his earlier concern by stating the following:
Under West Virginia law, this due process inquiry creates a
conflict of interest because the party charged with providing
this constitutionally required notice is also the tax lien
purchaser, who has a countervailing interest in profiting from a
property owner's failure to redeem. This conflict of interest
makes it imperative that courts strictly scrutinize the efforts of
a tax lien purchaser to ensure that they are "such as one
desirous of actually informing the absentee" might reasonably
adopt. 259
The list set forth in Mullane, and followed in Jones v. Flowers is stated as:
But when notice is a person's due process which is a mere
gesture is not due process. The means employed must be such
as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might
reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The reasonableness and
hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be
defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to
inform those affected or, where conditions do not reasonably
permit such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially

257

Id. at 890.
A provision that the statute of limitation would not start to run until the tax sale purchasers
enters into actual possession would be effective if the property were occupied by the "owner" or
one claiming under an owner, for example, a house or business establishment. However, if the
land was unimproved mountain land or mineral interest, the assertion of ownership or taking of
actual possession would not necessarily produce the same type of overt assertion of competing
rights. Seeking to evict an occupant is a clear overt assertion of a right as distinguished from
hunting or other similar activities on isolated, unimproved mountain land. Similarly, horizontal
drilling, beyond the well pad, provides no surface evidence of the underground activities.
259
Plemons v. Gale, 382 F. Supp. 2d 826, 830 (S.D. W. Va. 2005) (quoting Mullane v. Cent.
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950)).
258
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less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and
customary substitutes. 260
The very nature of this statement requires a fact specific examination
as reflected in Judge Goodwin's opinion, and Justice Ketchum's suggestion
that a tax lien purchaser should not be able to "lay low" to allow the passage of
time to provide a possible defense.
The use of tax sales to help "clear" titles to the "wretched and
embarrassed condition" of ownership of lands in "Western Virginia" has long
since passed. The advent of the secondary market, securitization of loans,
internet lending, and the increased frequency of bank mergers and acquisitions
have created a new set of problems, and the tax sales of this era have created a
new type of "land speculators." While the circumstances may have changed,
"due process" continues to provide the method of balancing the government's
need for tax revenues and the protection of an owner's property rights.
X. CONCLUSION

While there may be occasions where a "bright line test" furthers the
ends of justice, as it relates to the "due process" requirement in the context of a
tax sale case, a case by case approach would seem best. As Chief Justice
Roberts said in Jones v. Flowers:
For the reasons stated, we conclude the State should have taken
additional reasonable steps to notify Jones, if practicable to do
so.... We think there were several reasonable steps the State
could have taken. What steps are reasonable in response to new
information depends upon what the new information reveals.26 1
As Judge Goodwin said in Plemons following the remand:
According to Mullane, Mennonite, and the balancing tests set
out in well known cases such as Mathews v. Eldridge, due
process offers flexible protection that must be tailored to the
circumstances of each case. In addition to being fact-specific, I
think of due process as necessarily contemporary in nature. As
Justice Frankfurter noted:
"Due Process," unlike some legal rules, is not a
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to
time, place, and circumstances. Expressing as it does
in its ultimate analysis respect enforced by law for that
feeling of just treatment which has been evolved

260
261

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) (citations omitted).
547 U.S. 220, 234 (2006).
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through centuries of Anglo-American constitutional
history and civilization, "due process" cannot be
imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any
formula.

...

Due

process

is

not

a

mechanical

instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a
delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving
the exercise of judgment by those whom the
Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the
process. 262
In the per curiam decision in Reynolds v. Hoke,26 3 our Court looked at
the facts of the case to determine what constituted "reasonable diligence" and
concluded that the tax sale purchaser did not reasonably follow up on
information known to him.264
Plemons, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 831 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 162-163 (1961) (Frankfurt, J., concurring) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976)).
263
702 S.E.2d 629 (2010).
262

264

As set forth above, upon purchasing the tax lien on the subject property, the
appellee received a certificate of sale from the sheriff which listed the names
of both Bill Reynolds and Beverly Haynes as taxpayers of the property that
was delinquent for the taxes. The appellee mailed a notice of the right to
redeem the subject property to Bill Reynolds and he searched the public
records in the county clerk's office for any deed transfers indexed under the
name of Bill Reynolds. The appellee also mailed a notice of the right to
redeem to Beverly Haynes. Significantly, the appellee failed to search the
public records in the county clerk's office for deed transfers indexed under
the name of Beverly Haynes who was listed as a taxpayer on the property in
the certificate of sale given to the appellee. If the appellee had done so, he
would have discovered the February 8, 2006 quitclaim deed conveying the
subject property by Beverly Haynes to the appellants and filed in the county
clerk's office on June 7, 2006. Because Beverly Haynes' name appeared as a
taxpayer on the certificate of sale received by the appellee upon purchasing
the tax lien for the subject property, this Court finds as a matter of law that
reasonable diligence required that a search of the public records in the county
clerk's office be made to determine whether there were any deed transfers
indexed under the name of Beverly Haynes.
Further, the appellants' deed was of record in the county clerk's office during
the applicable time period as having received the subject property by
quitclaim deed from Beverly Haynes. Consequently, the appellee was
charged with exercising reasonable diligence to provide notice to the
appellants of their right to redeem the property. Moreover, there is evidence
in the record that the sheriffs office assessed the appellants for taxes on the
subject property for the year 2007. Specifically, the record contains a
statement of taxes due for the year 2007 sent by the Sheriff of Monroe
County to the appellants. Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11 A-3-23(a) (1998),
"the owner of, or any other person who was entitledto pay the taxes on, any
real estate for which a tax lien thereon was purchased by an individual may
redeem at any time before a tax deed is issued for the real estate." (Emphasis
added). Therefore, also as persons entitled to pay taxes on the property, the
appellants can redeem the property.
Id. at 632-33 (footnotes omitted).
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While those who profit from the tax sale procedure by buying property
at a fraction of the true value will assert that requiring them to take reasonable
steps to actually notify the "true" owner of their right to redeem will take away
their incentive to bid at tax sales, such an assertion actually serves to validate
Judge Goodwin's concerns. As to some of the tax sales purchasers, Mr.
Shuman in his "updated" article noted:
The trade of purchasing tax liens at sheriffs sales has many
within its ranks that can be termed "professionals." . . . Often,
at least in the author's personal experience, these
"professionals" miraculously "discover" the telephone number
or correct address of the property owner soon following the
recording of the tax deed, a number or address that eluded
them just several months before when providing the county
clerk with a list of parties entitled to notice to redeem.265
Also, as to the "risk" that the delinquent taxpayer may redeem, it is
important to note that the West Virginia statute, as recently amended, requires
the redeemer to reimburse the tax lien purchaser within one month with interest
at 12% per annum. 266
Given the fact that the United States Supreme Court has said: "Before a
State may take property and sell it for unpaid taxes, the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to provide the owner
2 67
'notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,"'
our courts will continue to be challenged by applying that safeguard. It is
submitted that what constitutes an appropriate effort to give adequate notice to
an owner of one's intent to "take" or usurp his or her property that is valuable,
has improvements and is occupied, will be different from a case involving an
abandoned mineral interest or wild and vacant mountain property. Therefore, a
case by case approach will be necessary to determine what constitutes due
process. The adoption of the amendment to the statute of limitation provision
suggested by Justice Ketchem in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. UP Ventures II,
LLC268 would serve to reduce efforts to "game" the system to avoid the issue of
whether due process requirements have been met. Also, it is noted that the 2010

See Shuman, Update, supra note 123, at 752-53.
Section llA-3-23 of the West Virginia Code provides what the redeemer must pay when
redeemed after the sheriff's tax sale. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 1 1A-3-23 (LexisNexis 2010). Section
11A-3-56 of the West Virginia Code provides what the redeemer must pay after the deputy
commissioner sale. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 1 lA-3-56 (LexisNexis 1995). Section 11A-4-4 of the
West Virginia Code provides the procedure, including the reimbursement in the above code
sections, that must be paid to set aside a "tax deed." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11 A-4-4 (LexisNexis
1994).
267
Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223 (2006) (citation omitted).
268
675 S.E.2d 883 (W. Va. 2009).
265

266
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amendment to West Virginia Code Section 11A-3-22(d) requiring notice to be
mailed to the "occupant" if the property is classified as Class II property at the
time of the assessment 269 is a step in the right direction toward assuring that due
process requirements are satisfied.
While such a requirement should help, a letter addressed to the
occupant is still not as likely to be as effective as a view combined with the
appropriate inquiry in getting the critical notice in the hands of the one most
likely to act upon the information contained in the notices.
However, as the United States Supreme Court noted in Mullane, "[a]n
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objection." 27 0 It is submitted that
"under all the circumstances," the party who is to provide notice may be
required as part of following through where the mailed notice is returned as
undelivered is to view or visit the property. 27 1 The duty to take a view is
already a part of the duty of a purchaser under our recording laws. 2 72 A visit to
the site is precisely what Sheriff Neil did on the day the clerk gave him the tax
deed in the Subearrier case, and that visit provided him the information
necessary to contact Subcarrier advise it, immediately after he had recorded the
tax deed, that he now "owned" its property.273 As Judge Goodwin noted in
Plemons, under a case by case approach the court would be able to determine
on the facts of each case whether a view or visit to the property should have
274
been a part of the reasonable effort to get notice to the delinquent taxpayer.

269

W. VA. CODE § IIA-3-22(d) (LexisNexis 2010).
In addition to the other notice requirements set forth in this section, if the real
property subject to the tax lien was classified as Class II property at the time
of the assessment, at the same time the State Auditor issues the required
notices by certified mail, the State Auditor shall forward a copy of the notice
sent to the delinquent taxpayer by first class mail, addressed to "Occupant",
to the physical mailing address for the subject property. The physical mailing
address for the subject property shall be supplied by the purchaser of the tax
lien pursuant to the provisions of section nineteen [§ 11 A-3-19] of this
article.

Id.
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
This argument was advanced in Subcarrier,but was not addressed by the court on appeal.
The case was decided on the basis of the prohibition of the sheriff's purchase at the tax sale under
Section 11A-3-6(a) of the West Virginia Code. Subcarrier Commc'ns, Inc. v. Nield, 624 S.E.2d
729, 738 (W. Va. 2005). Mr. Shuman in his article argues the Court should adopt such a
requirement. See Shuman, Update, supra note 123, at 728-29.
272
See John W. Fisher, The Scope of Title Examination in West Virginia: Can Reasonable
Minds Differ?, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 449, 496-500 (1996).
273
SubcarrierCommc'ns, Inc., 624 S.E.2d 729 at 732.
274
Plemons v. Gale, 298 F. Supp. 2d 380, 390 (S.D. W. Va. 2004).
270

271
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APPENDIX

III. PROPOSED ARTICLE 11A-5: AN OVERVIEW
A.

Goal of the Legislation

The goal of this legislation is to enable the state to dispose of forfeited
and delinquent property without every acquiring fee simple title to the property.
The state can't acquire title to the property without notifying the owner and
other interested parties, and the expense of this notice is excessive in light of
the benefits of fee simple ownership-since no one had bid on the property at
the sheriffs sale, or redeemed the property prior to the sale or during the
lengthy redemption period after the sale, it probably isn't worth owning, and
the state could expect to realize little or no revenue from its expense in
notifying owners that it was taking the property.
Thus, under the proposed system, the property never becomes
irredeemable while in the hands of the state. It only becomes irredeemable after
an individual purchaser has bid on the property, examined the title to discover
all parties entitled to notice that a deed will be issued, and paid the responsible
government official an amount necessary to pay for the service of the notice.
After the notice is served and a reasonable redemption period has expired, a
deed is issued for the property. This enables the state to shift the cost of due
process to a tax purchaser. Not only are the costs shifted, but the risks are
shifted as well. The state is only selling a right to obtain a deed upon the
completion of certain tasks. Each individual purchaser must perform these
tasks, and his failure to do so in no way jeopardizes the state's right to dispose
of other property.
The proposed legislation still provides for sales by both sheriffs and
The role of the sheriff remains the same. Indeed, the
commissioners.
deputy
statutes providing for sheriffs' sales have undergone little substantive change,
with the notable exception that lienholders will be required to file addresses
with the sheriff should they wish to receive notice of a pending tax sale.
The role of the deputy commissioner has changed a great deal,
however. Under the current system, the deputy commissioners institute suits in
the circuit courts to sell forfeited, delinquent and irredeemable, escheated, and
waste and unappropriated property. Title to this property, by definition, is
deemed vested in the state. Following Mennonite, it is clear that the system is
constitutionally flawed, as it divests owners of their rights in real property
without any notice other than notice of the pending tax sale, which is issued
nearly two years before the property becomes irredeemable. No notice is
provided to owners of forfeited property, and, in practice, lienholders also do
not receive notice.
The proposed legislation provides that such property is always
redeemable until sold. The deputy commissioner now acts as a state land agent
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in each county, who is in charge of disposing of the "orphan" property. He
conducts one public auction per year, and may sell property which is not
bought at the auction to anyone who expresses interest in the property. It is
expected that some property will remain with the deputy commissioner
indefinitely. Although this is not a "neat" way of disposing of this property, and
will do little to clear up land titles, it is much cheaper than performing title
searches on what is likely to be worthless property. Ultimately, the market will
determine whether such property is redeemed and put to use. Truly valuable
property is not likely to languish in the deputy commissioner's office for an
extended period. The proposed legislation requires a prospective tax purchaser
to take the same steps to obtain a deed, whether the property is purchased from
the sheriff or the deputy commissioner. Basically, he must perform a title
search, generate a list of names and addresses of persons entitled to notice that
a deed will be issued, and pay for the preparation and service of the notice.
Upon the expiration of the redemption period, the purchaser receives a deed to
the property.
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